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APEL SEEN UNWILLING TO DISCUSS ALTERNATIVE SECURITY POLICY

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 29 Mar 82 pp 29-30

[Article: "Visibly Defensive--Hans Apel Is Avoiding Any Discussions About Future Security Policy"]

[Text] Just back from the meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group in Colorado Springs, USA, Defense Minister Hans Apel engaged in an offensive exercise last Thursday [25 March], threatening that data and facts made public by his critics in the debate about the Tornado affair were "covered in the criminal code as military, even state, secrets."

Indignant about the uncovering of military bureaucratic slovenliness and cavalier handling of tax funds, the commander-in-chief said: "The consequences for our security are obvious, and so are the motives....This cannot and must not go on."

Worn down by arguments about pledges, decorations and funds, Apel is trying increasingly to evade bothersome confrontations by simply declaring military matters to be secret.

And so he also vehemently resisted the demand of his party friends at the Bonn SPD "Bundeswehr [Federal Armed Forces] Forum" a couple of weeks ago to give more thorough consideration to NATO strategy and armament in the future.

With this stubborn attitude of his, Apel is at odds with his party comrades Willy Brandt and **Egon Bahr**.

Ever since late last year Brandt has been calling on his party not simply to put up with nuclear weapons and old military formulas. The party chairman stated: "If reliable experts are to be believed, the chances of countering a conventional superiority of the possible aggressor with 'intelligent defensive weapons' are increasing. This is the route we should take in continuing our thinking."

And as far as Egon Bahr is concerned, the NATO strategy of staggered reaction, providing for escalation up to nuclear war, is but a strategy of transition which is not acceptable in the long run.

If deterrence should fail, Bahr also warned at the forum, the existence of Europe would be threatened by a nuclear holocaust. Therefore, the SPD disarmament expert demanded, a "radical rethinking" was needed. Otherwise there was a danger of a "universal refusal" by the population.

Apel showed himself unimpressed by his party friend's analysis, saying that he had only a limited understanding for "fear of war and war hysteria." The minister said that "we cannot forgo" the NATO strategy, including nuclear weapons. In his view a nuclear-free zone such as was called for in the Godesberg program and by many SPD district organizations, was "not a realistic aim in the foreseeable future." Brandt countered by saying: "It does not bother me if people say that they approve of nuclear-weapon-free zones."

At the SPD base too, an intensive debate has been going on for a long time about a security concept for the eighties and nineties. The fact that Brandt's call for seeking new ways in defense policy has been heeded by the base is shown by the 330 proposals for a policy of peace submitted for the Munich party congress--with several dozen calling for a rethinking.

With the blessing of the SPD Executive, the parliamentary deputies and the party, for example, are being asked to state their fundamental views on NATO strategy, on armament and fiscal plans and the equipment and organization of the armed forces.

Apel has only himself to blame for the fact that this debate in the SPD is taking place not with but against him. Four years after taking up his post of defense minister, the Social Democrat obviously has lost his unself-consciousness vis-a-vis military matters and the requisite distance from generals and their awkward bureaucracy.

Thus the man from Hamburg objected when coalition deputies suggested to him the appointment of a committee of experts to deal with the future problems of the alliance and the **Bundeswehr**. His reasons: The committee was to be composed not only of generals but also of parliamentarians and independent experts.

Instead he advocated a long-term committee in his ministry which soberly should analyze the present state of the Bundeswehr and "think the unthinkable."

The special homework which was to have been submitted in late March now will not be completed in time. First drafts went back to the writers on Apel's instructions because he thought they had painted too somber a picture and, among other things, suggested a scaling down of the Bundeswehr and of armament programs. Proposals for alternative defense concepts, which at first he had asked for himself, were not allowed by him to take shape. Week after week he erected new obstacles.

Without waiting for what the experts would come up with in the first place, he announced categorically that there "will always be" tanks, planes and ships--notwithstanding the fact that their effectiveness has long since been made a subject of controversy by the development of accurate missiles.

Organizing cadres of combat units (basic units with officers and non-commissioned officers, to be replenished with reservists in an emergency), Apel said in addition, was "out of the question." And, finally, he thought there was "no alternative" any longer to NATO and its strategy.

While such handicaps, which Juso [Young Socialist] chief Willi Piecyk thinks reflect a "Hardthoehe bunker mentality," are strengthening the traditionalists among the military, Apel's attitude is hardly likely to win him any friends among his comrades in Munich, who, as their party congress proposals show, want a Bundeswehr "visibly defensive" in organization and armament. Therefore, given the present mood in the party, it is definitely doubtful that the minister will be reelected to the party executive.

Apel's dashing remark that as far as he is concerned the Bundeswehr is the greatest peace movement has been corrected by Hans Koschnick, chairman of the Security Policy Committee of the SPD Executive, even before the party congress.

"The Bundeswehr," Koschnick made clear in Apel's presence, "is no peace movement; it is an instrument for insuring peace." The SPD, said the Bremen mayor, must now have the courage to develop alternatives to the present security policy--"just as Helmut Schmidt did when he was a young deputy."

These words might be followed by deeds sooner than Hans Apel would like. Thus the Hanover SPD district organization in its proposal for Munich called on the SPD deputies in the Bundestag to make "economies in the sector of the defense budget as well."

The recommendation of the Proposal Committee of the SPD Executive, chaired by Herbert Wehner, concerning this proposal is "acceptance."

8790
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THEATER FORCES

ITALY

PCI'S BUFALINI ON DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

Rome RINASCITA in Italian 26 Mar 82 pp 1, 39

[Article by Paolo Bufalini: "Negotiate for Peace." Slantlines denote italics as published.]

[Text] The international situation has, on one hand, grown alarmingly worse; on the other, exactly because of this, it also offers a framework for initiatives and the increase of manifestations of resistance or of opposition and struggle throughout the world, in Western Europe, and in America itself. The manifestations, initiatives and resistance are aimed at blocking the present terrifying nuclear arms race threatening Europe above all. They are also aimed at initiating a process of arms reduction and disarmament; and initiatives searching for a political, peaceful solution for extremely grave conflicts, beginning with El Salvador, which have, for ages, harshly and tragically struck and bloodied some countries, and over a short period, could precipitate in even graver situations for those populations and for peace.

A stalemate situation has come about in the Geneva talks concerning the gradual control over and reduction of nuclear armaments in the European theater. The renewal of negotiations--seemingly by agreement of the two parties, the United States and the USSR--has been put off to May; the hope is that this will permit the search for new positions and proposals capable of unblocking the situation. What is at stake is decisive for the future and for the very survival of humanity. Today, this is explicitly recognized by the most responsible and informed men at various levels in the two great powers.

For example, from Vadim Zagladin, vice-responsible for the International Department of the CPSU: "The problem that stands above all others is the problem of peace and war; in our nuclear age, this means the question of life and death." From Prof Eugene Rostow, military advisor to Reagan: "It is very difficult to explain that we have entered into a spiral of madness, but it is a fact that we have entered into it," and again, "The talks that we have begun are the last great chance that the world has to stop before catastrophe." From Sen Ted Kennedy, "We are reaching the fatal /point of no return/ in the arms race. As the years go by, the two superpowers become more and more afraid that the enemy can obtain a /first strike/ capability: once the /point of no return/ has passed, our lives will hang by a thread; just one human error will suffice to arrive at a world wide nuclear exchange.

Only a few minutes will remain for the strategists to make decisions for which days, if not years, are needed."

At the 26th CPSU Congress, Brezhnev sounded an equally clear alarm, coming to this conclusion: "It is necessary not to try to attempt to break the existing equilibrium, not to impose a new phase even more onerous and dangerous than the arms race... in both cases there is a certain parity in strategic nuclear arms or medium range nuclear missiles in Europe. The West has a certain superiority in some types of armaments, we have superiority in others, and the parity can be more solid when the accords and discussions concerning it are concluded. A military threat is effectively hanging over the United States, as it is over the other countries in the world. But its source is not the Soviet Union and its mythical superiority. It comes, instead, from the arms race itself and world tension. We are ready to battle side by side with the United States, the European countries, with all the countries of our planet against this threat, which is real and not false. To try to out-do each other in the arms race, to aim for victory in a nuclear war is absolute madness."

The U.S. Government (and others, too), has launched a password, "zero option," very suggestive, and it would be correct, if it were effective: if, that is, it had as its real objective the elimination of all long-range missiles with nuclear heads from Europe (naturally with the necessary controls and guarantees). But it isn't like that. In fact, Reagan asks the USSR to remove all Soviet missiles installed in Europe; in exchange, NATO will give up the Pershing 2 and cruise missiles. The Soviets object that, in this way, the Western powers would keep the hundreds of U.S. airplanes armed with nuclear weapons, plus the 58 French nuclear missiles, plus the 64 English missiles. Equilibrium in the European theater would thus break down decisively. There would be no type of "zero option"--the Soviets maintain--but unilateral missile disarmament in Europe on the part of the USSR. Explained in terms of its actual contents, the "zero option" thus becomes a proposal which the USSR does not accept.

On the other hand, even a Soviet proposal which--in exchange for Western renunciation of Pershing and cruise missile installation in Europe--would be limited to offering a "freeze" on European territory, (or a simple pulling back to the other side of the Urals of a quota of its theater and long-range missiles) would not be considered acceptable by the other side. The stalemate probably came about because of this.

We feel that in this framework it would be a grave error to underestimate Brezhnev's latest proposals at the tribune of the Congress of Soviet Unionists. "The Soviet leadership," said Brezhnev, "has decided to proclaim, unilaterally, a moratorium regarding the deployment of medium range nuclear arms in the European part of the USSR (and he specifies exactly the qualitative and quantitative "freeze"). This moratorium will rest in force up to the conclusion of an agreement with the United States, or it will end, "at the moment the United States' leadership proceeds with... the practical preparation for the deployment of Pershing 2 or cruise missiles in Europe."

Brezhnev adds that it is the intention of the USSR--if a new worsening of the international situation does not intervene--to reduce, /on its own initiative/, beginning with this year, a certain number of its medium-range missiles.

Brezhnev ties in and follows with proposals for other great problems: the problem of theater missiles in Europe, the renewal of strategic arms talks, the reduction of naval operations and, in particular, the limitation and control of nuclear submarine activities, conventional weaponry and the so-called measure of reciprocal confidence and trust.

This is an important and significant initiative. To it, Reagan, (and many of our commentators as well) immediately answered, "This is a simple 'freeze' on Soviet superiority; it is not good; it is not enough." Agreed--it's not enough; but the answer is completely inappropriate, irrelevant. In fact, one forgets that the "freeze" decided by Soviet leadership is not in any way a proposal for the solution to which the negotiations with the other side must aim. No. It is simply a moratorium, decided unilaterally and unconditionally by the Soviet Union. It seems clear that this is a decision aiming towards a renewal of talks, and their development in a more serene climate. It is a unilateral and unconditional gesture of good will, aimed at reassuring the counterpart: to reassure it, that is, that while waiting for the renewal of talks, and during them, the USSR will not increase--neither quantitatively nor qualitatively--its own missile power in the European theater, and, moreover, that it intends to reduce it on its own initiative (and by this, in fact, it recognizes some justification for the need for reequilibrium in European theater nuclear arms).

We wish to note that in June 1980--at the Brezhnev-Schmidt meeting in Moskow--the Soviet Union had already abolished any preconditions to negotiations on theater missiles in Europe. The NATO governments (including Italy) which had authorized the construction of the "Euromissiles" in 1979, committed themselves to beginning those negotiations with the Soviet Union immediately. It was therefore obligatory, on the basis of the decisions made at that NATO Council, to take appropriate initiatives for beginning negotiations with the Soviet Union immediately, in accordance with the so-called dissolution clause, pushed by the Socialist Internationale, the SPD, and the PSI itself. Instead, no negotiations were begun at that time. No initiative in that sense was ever taken by the Italian government, despite the precise commitment made in the Senate, under the pressure of Sen Granelli, and of the president of the Council, at that time, Honorable Francesco Cossiga.

There is more. In June 1981, at a Brandt-Brezhnev meeting in Moskow, the Soviet Union proposed a moratorium on the installation of Soviet missiles, with the single condition that negotiations begin: with no strings attached concerning suspension of the construction of Pershing 2 and cruise missiles. No one has ever been able to explain how this moratorium would have consolidated Soviet missile superiority in Europe. Wasn't it, in fact, the opposite? The putting into operation of the SS-20's was "frozen" while the construction of U.S. and NATO Euromissiles was permitted! If this moratorium initiating negotiations had been carried out, we would have dozens fewer SS-20's

installed in Europe today, and we would be at a more advanced stage in negotiations, and perhaps in a climate of reduced tension.

Today, in any case, Brezhnev's proposals constitute a further step ahead. The Soviet Union actuates the moratorium, unilaterally and unconditionally, hoping that it will favor the renewal of effective dialogue, of fruitful negotiations.

Of course, we are well aware that the problems are complex and difficult. We do not sustain any particular thesis (because we are unable to, as well), except that of principle: reciprocal security and equilibrium; armament equilibrium at the lowest level, gradually lowering levels even further, until a real /zero option/ is reached.

In the United States, this need is sustained with lucidity and vigor by Democratic Sen Edward Kennedy, who considers both the U.S. and Soviet positions with which the Geneva negotiations were opened impracticable. His proposal is advanced in the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution, voted for by 165 US legislators from both the Senate and the House. This aims--we think--at a "zero option" which, to be effective, must be worldwide, total. An immediate, total freeze of all nuclear arms on the part of both superpowers is proposed. It is explained that the "freeze," if tied in with the limitation of already existing arsenals, could induce the USA and the USSR /to change direction, abandoning the race to rearm and starting on a competition in disarmament./

At the same time, in an interesting interview with ASTROLABIO, the Soviet leader Zagladin puts forth a series of hypotheses--from those immediately resolvable, to others which are gradual and differentiated--of agreements on nuclear and conventional disarmament, articulated temporally and geographically. Sen Luigi Granelli (DC) has commented on these hypotheses and proposals, writing, "In the effort to illustrate, in an extraordinarily conciliating tone, a vast and flexible range of possible solutions, which, by the way, correspond in many cases to proposals officially advanced by the USSR, Vadim Zagladin comes very close to the 'zero option.' Every step in this direction," concludes Granelli, "should be encouraged."

When what is involved is peace, which is not only a supreme value, but an absolutely indispensable condition for the defense of civilization and the very survival of humanity; when the problems are so entwined, two things are necessary. The first is to have the objective conditions clear, the goals to follow, the outlook: of the world and of every country. The second is to encourage every step in the right direction.

Today, more than ever, every gesture of good will must be welcomed, and not permitted to pass by; a mass movement must be intensified and enlarged in all forms, a movement capable in a decisive moment for the future of humanity, of imposing an end to the rearmament race, and the beginning of the process of disarmament.

Finally, I shall permit myself to note two essential themes.

/First/ Brutalized and oppressed peoples must be liberated. We are with them. Let Reagan not be deluded in thinking he can repress them with the purposely false theory of "terrorism" of "Soviet-Cuban plots." The struggles for the liberation of peoples are just and sacrosanct: without struggle there can be no liberation. What is necessary to avoid and prevent in such situations is involvement of the rivalry and struggle between the great powers, between the blocks: this, in the interest of the liberation of peoples and in the interest of peace. Agreement between the two greatest powers is the first, even if not the only, basis for peace; but the rivalry between the great powers must not be transferred to the Third World. The cause of the development of economically backward countries, is, in its specificity and autonomy, a central step in the struggle for peace, democracy and socialism.

Political and peaceful solutions for the grave, tragic and dangerous present crises must be rapidly found, due to the profound influence that such situations have on the very question of detente and disarmament. We think of El Salvador and Central America. We think of the Middle East and Lebanon. We think of Afghanistan and Cambodia. We think of southern Africa, and of other conflicts. And we think of Poland, too, whose crisis has taken an authoritarian turn that introduces a new element of international tension. It is urgent that in Poland, dialogue and collaboration are again taken up between the fundamental responsible national components, putting into effect again union and democratic liberties.

/Second/ Europe, Western Europe, must carry out, in such a dramatic and decisive moment, the function that history has assigned to its labor, democratic, progressive and pacifist movement.

We do not ask Western Europe to be neutral. We ask: 1) that Europe, remaining allied to the United States, (because neither do we aim at a unilateral alteration in the equilibrium of power in Europe, and this with the very aim of promoting the process of detente and the overcoming of the blocks), and at the same time not hostile to the Soviet Union, therefore be a friend to both the United States and the Soviet Union; 2) that it carry out even more fully its independent initiatives in favor of detente, disarmament, and of a political and peaceful solution for existing conflicts. Because of this, we are regarding with great interest all possibilities that are open to rapprochement and new understandings among the labor parties, among the leftists, and among the forces that are for peace and progress in Europe.

9941
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FLNC RESUMES ATTACKS AS WARNING TO GOVERNMENT

Self-Determination; Colonialist Targets

Paris LE MATIN in French 13 Feb 82 p 2

[Text] Two armed attacks, one of which caused a death; 26 attacks with explosives on Corsica and on the mainland; the truce announced by the FLNC [Front for the National Liberation of Corsica] on 3 April 1981 was interrupted during the night from Thursday to Friday [11-12 February] with a violence which, for the first time, showed their readiness to kill.

Although the series of attacks with explosives made against police stations, the vacation residences of "colonialists," and the buildings of EDF [Electricity Company of France] in Aix-en-Provence and Marseille is in the "tradition" of FLNC actions, the attacks-- one of them leading to one death--against members of the Foreign Legion and a noncommissioned officer of the air force reflect a clear hardening by the FLNC regarding the presence of the armed forces in Corsica. Moreover, these attacks which, according to investigators, were the work of the same commando unit, have not been claimed as the work of any group. They took place according to the same scenario. At about 9:00 pm two members of the Foreign Legion who were guarding a rest house of the Legion about 25 km south of Bastia were attacked by unknown persons who fired several shots at them. One of the two members of the Legion, Renato Rossi, 45 years old, born in Italy, died after he had been taken to a hospital. The other one, Maurice Steint, 24 years old, was as of last night [12 February] in very serious condition. At 10:30 pm on the night of 11 February, the same night the members of the Legion were attacked, an unknown person, also armed with a 9 mm pistol, entered the home of Chief Adjutant Aberkaner, of the air force, near Solenzara, and fired several shots, hitting him in the legs.

Attack on Legionnaires

Paris LE MATIN in French 13 Feb 82 p 3

[Article by Sylvia Florence]

[Text] A member of the Foreign Legion assassinated, a second death; a pilot from the military base at Solenzara seriously wounded; and about 20 attacks

with plastic explosives made throughout the island against police posts under construction, vacation homes belonging to people from the mainland and the house of a state employee: that is the sum total of the "blue and bloody night" of the Front for the National Liberation of Corsica [FLNC]. It was a classical "blue night" of the kind dear to clandestine elements. Corsica has spent a few dozen such nights since the establishment of the FLNC movement on 5 May 1976 and up to the declaration of a truce on "military operations," announced on 3 April 1981 to permit the election and then the establishment of a government of the Left.

This time it was a night of red blood for the first time, because never before, until yesterday, had the FLNC deliberately killed anyone. In claiming this series of attacks the spokesman of the partisans of Corsican independence stated in an anonymous telephone call that this was a "warning."

A warning which was like a shot across the bow for the Socialist government, if you refer to the text of the leaflets thrown around in the streets during the night from Thursday to Friday [11-12 February] in Bastia and Ajaccio.

The leaflets said, "Our actions are not a breaking of the truce but rather a warning made necessary by the facts of the political, economic, social, and cultural situation after what will soon be 1 year under the new government in France. Our action constitutes a measure taken for the preservation of the fundamental interests of our people, which we will never agree to sacrifice. On 10 May [1981] another government was installed in France, creating a new political situation which had to be taken into consideration. We have done this. The basic reason and intelligence of our struggle required it. Any other attitude would have been irresponsible."

By striking forcefully the other night the FLNC has sought to remind people of its existence and its claims. Its existence first of all, by means of a perfectly organized military operation, in the purest style of commando attacks like those it has carried out in the past. Then its claims, by taking under fire traditional targets symbolizing "French colonialism." The first target was the Foreign Legion. The first target for the militants of the FLNC has always been the dissolution of the Legion and the departure from Corsica of the 2,500 troops assigned on the island, divided between the Second Foreign Legion Paratroop Regiment in Calvi, the Second Foreign Legion Infantry Regiment in Bonifacio, and the training center in Corte. The parties of the Left in France, during the recent electoral campaigns, had called for the dissolution of the Foreign Legion and the departure of the troops from Corsica. By killing one and wounding another member of the Legion, only a few hours after the funeral of the 36 victims of the air disaster in Djibouti, the FLNC expressed its disapproval in its own way. For the past week certain nationalists let it be known through the use of cover language that the "national funeral rites could have an unexpected echo."

The second target taken under fire was the Gendarmerie [rural French police force]. By destroying almost entirely the three new barracks under construction at Sari d'Orcino, Zicavo, and Cargesse, the FLNC has taken action against the "forces of repression," whose presence in the villages of the interior of the island it opposes. We recall that the previous government had provided for a plan for the construction of 21 new brigade centers. The third target, also as characteristic of the activities of the clandestine forces, was vacation homes. These are, for the most part, rather luxurious homes, situated in locations much frequented by tourists, including the southern shore of the Gulf of Ajaccio, the areas around Valinco south of Proriano, etc, belonging to Frenchmen from the mainland. "It is the French who are colonizing our land," explained the FLNC, scribbling almost everywhere on roads and buildings the sign "IFF" [I Francesci Fora—French, Get Out]. The fourth target was the home of the Corsica director of youth and sports activity under the Ministry of Leisure, an administration whose policies have often been challenged.

The last target in this group was an important pharmaceutical warehouse in Ajaccio. There the FLNC wished to denounce "certain scandalous practices which control the working world. The bosses of the Right and the clans of the Left know so well how to join together to exploit the workers."

Demanding the complete restructuring of the electoral lists and not merely the revision presently underway, demanding also the dismantling of the political clans, the rehabilitation of the Corsican language and culture, a university adapted to the aspirations and demands of the Corsican people, the FLNC notes: "What do they offer us? It's just the illusion of an electoral circus which distracts our consciences and energies. There are always frauds, electoral combinations, transactions, swollen electoral lists, party horse-trading.... The situation today is catastrophic. Just putting on the brakes no longer is enough." To put an end to these practices, which it has denounced for years, the FLNC concludes by stating that it is expecting concrete action from the government. The most important action as far as it is concerned is the recognition "of the national rights of the Corsican people." In fact, the right to self-determination, the first stage toward independence.

This is an ideological view which the immense majority of Corsicans does not share. The continued attachment to France is ceaselessly recalled by elected representatives from one end to the other of the political spectrum and, in addition, by the "ordinary citizens" when they come out of their silence.

However, sure of the rightness of its cause, the FLNC has shown today that it does not fear being set to one side, being ignored as it never has been since its creation. Today the man in the street, frightened by this murderous escalation of violence and this new wave of plastic bomb attacks, is asking himself, "But where are we going?"

FLNC Blamed

Paris LE MATIN in French 13 Feb 82 p 3

[Article by Stephane Muracciole]

[Text] The FLNC [Front for the National Liberation of Corsica], which has claimed the series of attacks with explosives in Corsica and on the mainland, emphasizes that this is not a breaking of the truce, but a "warning" made necessary, according to it, by the "political, economic, social, and cultural situation on the island after nearly 1 year under the new government."

This "night of red blood" has provoked many reactions. Charles Hernu, who yesterday [12 February] attended the burial of Calvi of 26 members of the Foreign Legion killed in an aircraft accident in Djibouti, emphasized that the murderous attack against the military personnel "was a real assassination effort." Gaston Defferre has stated, for his part, "that no government can accept allowing itself to be dominated by violence."

In the view of investigators the Front for the National Liberation of Corsica is solely responsible for the attacks with automatic weapons against two members of the Foreign Legion (one of them was killed) and a sergeant in the Air Force, as well as attacks using explosives. In effect the FLNC speaks of "its actions" without dissociating the actions against the three military personnel from the attacks with explosives. Furthermore, the FLNC has always been careful to dissociate itself from those responsible for attacks in which it was not involved. In this case it has not done so.

Thursday evening [11 February] in the commune of Ventiseri, a place in the mountains 100 km south of Bastia, Air Force Sergeant Major Gerard Habermacher, 39 years old, was returning home from the air base at Solenzara, where he has been assigned for the past 10 years. He lived in a detached house which you reach after passing through a small garden. At about 7:45 pm he reached home, followed shortly thereafter by two individuals wearing masks. With one shot from the 9 mm pistol the watchdog was neutralized, having been wounded. The telephone wires were cut. The two men then entered the garage which connects with the kitchen through a door whose lock was shot away by a firearm. Of course, Gerard Habermacher jumped at them. A shot hit him in the wrist. At the same time the sergeant major was hit in the left leg by a burst of 9 mm bullets. His attackers, who were wearing hoods, ran away. Investigators found at the scene of the attack no less than 30 empty cartridge cases.

One hour and a half earlier, 70 km to the north, in the vicinity of Sorbo-Ocagnano, Chief Corporal Renato Rossi, 45 years old, and Airman Second Class Maurice Steint, 24 years old, were on guard in front of a Foreign Legion vacation camp. They were staying in the one-story bungalow where the kitchen and the administrative offices of the establishment are located. They were not armed, as the rest center was not considered a military post.

The two men were sitting in front of a television, set, showing them almost in profile when you looked in the window. From the outside the men in hoods and canvas masks who had just taken up their positions could see their targets perfectly. Bullets of 7.65 mm caliber and bursts of 9 mm bullets-- all of it happened very quickly. The chief corporal and his companion were hit. The former was hit in the chest with six bullets; the latter was hit with a bullet in his jaw.

One of them succeeded in reaching the telephone to call for help. Renato Rossi, the only one still conscious upon the arrival of help, was to die during his transfer to the hospital. Maurice Steint, who had recovered consciousness when he was admitted to the Bastia hospital, was still in critical condition last night [12 February]. On the grounds near the point of attack the police found 16 empty cartridge cases coming from at least two weapons.

"It's murder," "a revolting crime," "who could have expected such a thing" --the comments were going full blast yesterday [12 February] in Bastia. "In 1976 perhaps one could have understood this better," said one comment. At the time the Legion had almost everyone against it, due to numerous cases of desertion; the murder of two shepherders in Bustanico in October, 1976, by a young cavalry recruit; and because of open battles that took place in the bars of Corte during evening leave periods. Still later, in September, 1978, there was anger at the Legion over the murder of a German tourist in the Agriates area by a soldier who had become a deserter 4 months after his participation in the operations in Zaire; anger at the Legion because of the two young girls the same individual had taken hostage.

For the last few weeks the Legion had begun to reappear in the communique issued by the Corsican nationalists. They renewed their demands for its departure, for its dissolution.

People talked of the Legion, more dramatically this time because of the death of the green berets killed in the crash of a Noratlas aircraft near Djibouti, and who were returned yesterday morning [12 February] at Calvi, in the presence of Charles Hernu. After the burial Minister of Defense Hernu answered a few questions, stating: "Dissolution of the Legion? This is not at all the day to talk about it. Departure of the Legion from Corsica? This is not really been considered, the more so as the views heard today from elected Corsican representatives seem to the contrary to ask for keeping the Legion where it is."

So, if the commandos who killed a man the night before last [11 February] did so to make the minister yield, it appears that a man died for nothing.

CONDITIONS PROFFERED FOR CONTINUED MEMBERSHIP IN EEC

Athens TA NEA in Greek 23 Mar 82 pp 1,4

[Excerpts] Yesterday in Brussels, in a note presented by deputy minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Gr. Varfis, to the president of the Minister's Council, the government asks the EEC for more money and more flexibility--that is, the possibility to deviate from certain rules of the Community--in order to successfully meet special problems in our economy. At the same time, the government emphasizes its decision to base the process of the development of the Greek economy on a national overall plan because the country needs a long-term policy to solve the problems of development.

In its memorandum, which describes the conditions for the cooperation of Greece with the EEC, the government makes reference to the problems which characterize the socio-economic life of the country and emphasizes that its two basic options are:

First, the development of industry, with the main objectives being the stabilization of production, the increase of the ad valorem tax, the development of strategic and technologically developed industries in addition to the support of small-to-medium size businesses.

Second, keeping the rural population in rural areas, within the framework of a wider administrative and economic decentralization for the support of farm income, the significant strengthening of the cooperative movement, and the improvement of its socio-political infrastructure.

It is forecast, with the urgent measures taken by the government, that during 1982 there will be noted:

A small increase in the national income.

A small reduction in the balance of payments deficit.

A drop in the rate of inflation.

A noticeable reduction of the public sector deficit from 17 percent to 12 percent in the GNP

The Greek government also makes reference to a series of premises on which it bases its belief that the EEC has not implemented its declarations on Community action

to solve the inequalities between regions and its members. It characterized as especially insufficient the transfer of monies from the Community's budget to the less developed countries, particularly Greece, while at the same time it is emphasized that the use of the Greek economy, even in the Mediterranean area, is more unfavorable.

Mr. Varfi's Statements

After the presentation of the memorandum, the deputy minister of Foreign Affairs responsible for EEC matters, Mr. Gr. Varfis, stated in Brussels that the Greek government understands that a fair and reasonable margin of time for the new situation in the relations of Greece with the EEC is needed but, he emphasized, that the matter of supporting farm income is urgent. Mr. Varfis also stated that the position of the Greek government, vis-à-vis the EEC will be defined after months-long negotiations have been concluded and he added that Premier Mr. A. Papandreu will explain and elaborate on the political dissent of the memorandum at the Brussels summit meeting on 29 March.

Mr. Varfis emphasized that the Greek government "is ready to cooperate with the European Committee and to give it all the related data according to areas. The first step was taken. We are awaiting the opinion of the European Committee."

"In the note," Mr. Varfis emphasized, "no explicit mention is made of Greece's withdrawal from the EEC. The topic of the note will be discussed in the regular meetings of the ministers, after the European Committee, as we requested, studies the subjects of the memorandum and offers its proposals."

In answer to a question, the deputy minister of foreign affairs said, "The note and the developments related to it are not absolutely connected to the vote. The Greek government," he said, "is free to decide on the position it will take after the completion of the talks," and he added that these talks will not be a matter of days or weeks, but of months. "We will wait, we will negotiate and we will see," Mr. Varfis said, explaining that the Greek government will, of course, give the Community a fair margin of time to find new arrangements in the relations of Greece with the EEC.

At the end of his interview, Mr. Varfis said, "The Greek government believes that the special Greek problems can be solved:

- a. With a series of special arrangements and measures of temporary departure from Community rules and,
- b. With as wide and more efficient use as possible of the various Community funds in the financing of the Greek development programs."

9731
CSO: 4621/268

LOANS GRANTED BY FOREIGN BANKS

Bank Consortium Loan

Athens TA NEA in Greek 20 Mar 82 p 1

[Text] A loan for the amount of 540 million dollars will be granted to our country by a consortium of 18 foreign banks.

The preliminary agreement was signed yesterday. The loan is to be for ten years with an interbanking interest rate of one-half of one percent.

The loan will be used to cover the balance of payments deficit of the country while one part will be converted into drachmas to cover the expenditures of the government investment program.

The final agreement for the granting will be signed, in all probability, next month in Paris.

European Investment Bank Loan

Athens TA NEA in Greek 23 Mar 82 p 1

[Text] The great capability of obtaining loans by our country was demonstrated for a second time and within a very short period of time from the day that an international consortium of banks granted a loan in the amount of 540 million dollars through the Greek National Bank.

The second loan will be granted by the European Investment Bank and will amount to 200 million in European currencies -- that is, more than 200 million dollars. The president of the European Investment Bank will come to Greece during the first part of April for this purpose.

The president of the bank will meet with the Minister of Coordination, Mr. Ap. Lazaris, the deputy minister of said ministry, Mr. I. Potakis, and the president of the Greek National Bank, Mr. Al. Mangakis, as representatives of Greece.

9731
CSO:4621/268

FREE TRANSPORTATION STUDIED

Athens TA NEA in' Greek 20 Mar 82 p 1

[Text] The Ministry of Communications' study group proposes the abolition of fares for urban transportation and the collection of an amount from the bills of the DEI [Public Power Corporation], water bill or some other method.

According to the study group, the following factors recommend it:

1. The fact that transportation is essentially a social subsidy to the lower income classes as well as the apparent impression of the "deficit" of urban transportation. This social subsidy is granted in all the Western and Eastern countries (for example, urban transportation is subsidized by the State in Antwerp at 68 percent, in Sofia at 68 percent, in Marseilles at 70 percent).
2. Public transportation is, one way or another, subsidized by the State budget.
3. The operational cost of public transportation would significantly decrease with the abolition of the fare. (It is calculated to be two billion drachmas a year).
4. Significant shortening of travel time in the transportation of passengers, and,
5. Such a solution is within the framework of a more generalized government policy of the Change, by decentralization and a more just distribution of financial burdens on the people.

9731
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VAN DER LOUW'S PLAN FOR UNEMPLOYED YOUTH

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 6 Mar 82 pp 21-23

[Report by W.G.J. Bavelaar on prospects for alleviating youth unemployment: Heidemij Plan: 10,000's at Work Within a Few Months: Unemployed Youths Can Do Something for Their Millions]

[Text] "Let the unemployed youths do something for their benefit payments." That is the philosophy of CRM [Culture, Recreation and Social Affairs] Minister Andre Van Der Louw. He wants the young people who do not have paying jobs to carry out community tasks for a certain period of time. He has given up on his original plan to make the raking in the parks obligatory, particularly because of pressure from his [party's] following. Is youth unemployment insoluble? Heidemij [a think tank] has plans already drawn up to put several 10,000's of young people to work. For there is still a lot of work to do in our country.

Despite stiff criticism from many sides, CRM Minister Andre Van Der Louw is carrying on with his plans to give unemployed youths something to do. The minister seems to have taken to heart some of the criticism from his own delegation, party leadership, youth organizations and Ien Dales, Den Uyl's bold secretary of state.

The element of obligation to work for the benefit of society has been pulled out of the plan. Future objectors, will not have their benefits reduced. There will be no question of force, as the minister proposed as a last resort in his first plans. He has now chosen in favor of the course of advice and persuasion. In a few weeks he will present a completed plan. The many tens of thousands of unemployed up to the age of 23 years would have to begin to do some useful work, in the interest of building up "work discipline." "The state may demand something of its subjects, that has an educational effect." Youths, those who have left school and cannot find a living yet, should be able to find a sensible pastime in environmental work, supply and transportation.

Van Der Louw says that he understands that we live in a different time now; we no longer live in the New Left's ideas of a leisure society; there has come

to be a strong revaluation of the concept of work, and this time likewise urges equally forcefully a necessary tightening of the welfare society. There is to be a bit less in the welfare sector as well. The opinion presented with bravura and flair by Den Uyl's possible heir met with approval from much of the Chamber. The time is ripe for it.

"Progressive people, too, must dare to choose for unpleasant things, as is already the case here," said Van Der Louw when he presented his plans.

Last week, the Chamber delegation dropped its objections to the community tasks plan, now that the financial sanctions have been scrapped. The organized youths still hold it against the minister ("I used to carry milk around, myself") that he is not seeking structural solutions. The complaint: if Van Der Louw feels that not enough people are available for certain services, why is he not making jobs of them? Youths who were obviously enthusiastic about honorable and healthy work went to Van Der Louw's residence and carried out some volunteer spadework in his garden. The minister did not mean it so literally.

At the NVV [Netherlands Trade Federation] youth liaison, the criticism has become somewhat milder in the meantime. After the removal of the punitive sanctions, even the people there say that unemployed youths do want to do volunteer community tasks. The government simply has to remove the obstacles which tie these chores to retaining a benefit payment.

But these chores can also be done with a regular wage, at least according to the eager accountants at Heidemij in Arnheim. Because of the government cutbacks, this developer and executor of projects which fall primarily in the public sector has wound up with fewer contracts. The firm, which is nearly 100 years old, is facing the layoff of hundreds of personnel. To prevent the further loss of jobs and under the pressure of concerned labor unions, the people at that firm began to examine its field of work carefully and came to the conclusion that enormous quantities of work can be expected, frequently in the governmental sphere. In taking inventory of the work that can still be expected to be carried out, Heidemij came up with 54 proposals, which are divided into many projects, some of which are ready to be begun now and some of which can be begun within a few months.

The extent of the added employment which could be created by starting on necessary things which are not now being done, and by accelerating the work on projects which are now getting underway too slowly was studied. Both are desirable, but are not being done due to the lack of money. It is shown that if the unemployment moneys saved could be added to the funds, and if in some cases existing spending regulations could be applied a bit more broadly, the added or accelerated execution of the projects becomes possible. Then a program is created for employing 34,000 men annually in grounds, roads and waterways, cultural technology and forestry. And a further 25,000 men in construction, per year.

"We have made virtue of a necessity," says Dr L.E. De Graaff of Heidemij. The internal search for new jobs came at about the same time as the hubbub in

the Hague about the jobs plans. There, Minister Den Uyl was worrying himself sick about how to create 30,000 new jobs.

"We know an outstanding destination for those government billions. Between now and the next 3 months, we can put those tens of thousands right to work," says Mr De Graaff. In useful and necessary work. Not in the manner in which the Heidemaatschappij went about creating work in the 1930's by putting a shovel in the hands of the army of unemployed, but by having mechanized work done, by catching up on lax major maintenance, in instituting technical environmental provisions and industrial transfers, city and town development.

Just take woods and landscape. The quality of the younger woods in particular is declining due to inadequate maintenance. Wood production, recreation and nature suffers from that. Besides the 3,400 people now working in forestry, a further 1,200 are needed permanently, as well as another 2,500 to catch up on the lagging maintenance for the next 5 years. The work in the woods can begin tomorrow and does not require investments. Unemployed youths can be employed particularly in the maintenance.

Landscaping (hedges, wooded windbreaks, small woods, wooded polderlands, plantings along roads, planting for posterity) is scarcely being maintained now. The farmers do not need the wood any more. According to Heidemij's calculations, 1,400 people ought to be working at this each year. One side effect: hardwood production would increase. In order to catch up on arrears, a further 800 men would have to work in this field for 5 years. Something has to be done to prevent the birches and firs from choking the heaths, otherwise the heaths will disappear. There is work here for 80 men for 5 years. Military maneuver areas can be used for recreation. There is 5 years' work of 200 men there. Heath turf is rich in humus and important for compost. With a budget of 500,000 guilders, a test project can begin.

If composting succeeds, this process will probably be economically profitable on a large scale. This is work for 200 men. Another 700,000 hectares of agricultural land is under consideration for structural improvement. This will not be achieved for another 40 years if the present program is carried out. Heidemij is therefore asking for an accelerated tempo.

There is still more to do. Besides a number of provisions in the area of recreation, Heidemij expects the most work to be able to be provided in the area of the environment: about 13,000 jobs. There is a lot of work to be done in this small, polluted and overcrowded country. A quick summary: about half a million residences are not yet connected to a sewage system. Many sewage systems need to be reconstructed in order to fit into new purification systems, and in order to replace old, leaking systems which pollute the ground water.

And immediately: accelerating the study and alleviation of ground pollution, establishing storage places for pollutants dug up, establishing and improving dumps, recycling household wastes, pooling areas for chemical wastes and the so-called residential drainage. The high ground water level causes 10 percent

of the residential areas to be too damp. The quality of life, the durability of the house, and especially the consumption of fuel suffer from that.

Thus, there is employment for 60,000 unemployed on paper. Those taking the inventory held the office studies up to the light again and this time they looked to see what the effects of this would be on the urgent problem of youth unemployment. They came up with the creation of 6,600 youth jobs. This entails a further 2,600 jobs for skilled workers, foremen and directors. The jobs can all be created within 1 year. On a schedule of from 1 to 3 months, as many as 2,000 trainee positions can be started.

What will all of this cost? Reemploying 60,000 people who are looking for work will require about 5 billion guilders. An astronomic figure. But, so it is figured, 1.6 billion guilders come from the unemployment benefits which can now be paid as wages, 0.9 billion can come from existing subsidies, 1.2 billion can come from the owners of the sites and projects for which the work is to be done. All that remains is a paltry 1.2 billion guilders of "employment funds," which the government, which is hunting for employment, will have to pay out to keep the gate open. "These are important investment."

"In the past years, there were great cutbacks in maintenance. Further delay will bankrupt us later, recovery from the damage caused by just continuing to delay will cost much more than is being asked now," according to De Graaff.

He considers the problem of employment to be more of an organizational problem. "In the so-called fourth sector, we have really had a good look," he says. The creation of jobs there has an "addictive" effect. Once there are jobs there, it is hard to get rid of them. Do you have to drive workers like this "to the wall" without any consideration in a recession like the one from which we are suffering now? And what can be said about the theory that the funds becoming available to the government could better be devoted to a general tax reduction for industry? Engineer (roads and waterways) Dr (general economy) De Graaff shows that in this instance he still holds with a Keynesian pattern of thought: in times of economic recession, the government must create initiatives in order to prop up spending and encourage investments. "We are doing our part to help out with the government's policy of creating concrete jobs. We have them lying ready for us."

The Heidemij plan is currently being studied by many of the institutions involved. Objections have yet to be heard.

It is always nice to encounter such general, friendly benevolence.

6940

CSO: 3105/142

CIVIL SERVICE, MILITARY PAY ADJUSTMENTS ANNOUNCED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 15 Feb 82 pp 1,7

[Text] Ankara--The new fiscal principles of State Personnel Law No 657, which was approved 2 days ago by the National Security Council and which will go into effect on 1 March, provide an average 25-percent increase in all civil servants' monthly salaries. Retirees as well as civil servants will benefit from the increases secured as a result of the changes that were made. For this reason, in addition to amending the civil servant index table, the index table for retirees has been changed.

After fiscal principles of Law No 657 were altered, similar modifications were directed to the retired. Accordingly, the index table for retirees starts at 380 and goes up to 1,090. Likewise, a new table has been compiled for those who, retiring at the last level of the first degree, collect supplementary benefits. Increases shown in the index tables for both civil servants and retired civil servants will be put into force beginning 1 March.

The law approved by the National Security Council and to be published in tomorrow's RESMI GAZETE also eliminates MEYAK [Government Employees Mutual Aid Society] deductions.

The average 25-percent hike in civil servants' monthly salaries comes primarily from four elements in the new system. The first is an increase in the coefficient. (This was raised to 30 in the budget.) The second is the change in the index table; and the third, an increase in side payments. (This increase was secured also by a raise from 6 to 8 in the coefficient in the budget.) The last is a newly introduced compensation of 20 percent.

The law gives the Council of Ministers the authority to decide "who will benefit from the 20-percent compensation." The 20-percent compensation refers to 20 percent of the money earned by a civil servant at the first degree. In other words, it is 20 percent of the 60,000-lira-per-month salary or 12,000 liras. Therefore, the "20-percent compensation" results in a net wage increase of 12,000 liras.

Under the decision presented to the Council of Ministers, the maximum net compensation can be 12,000 liras. The Council of Ministers may adjust this amount from 1,000 liras to 12,000 liras. Those who may benefit from the 12,000-lira net compensation include all health services personnel working in the state sector, technical services personnel, supervisory employees, and high-level civil servants performing specific jobs.

However, all these employees will be examined according to "job location and job characteristics" and, with the approval of the Council of Ministers, will receive the supplementary compensation of between 1,000 and 12,000 liras. Here, for example, an engineer working at a dam may be paid the entire 12,000 liras or the entire 20-percent base while an engineer working in an office at Ankara headquarters may receive a specific percentage of the 20-percent such as 4,000 liras.

A Council of Ministers decision will, within the next week, determine the persons within specific professional groups who will obtain the compensation and the amounts they will receive. The decision will be published in the RESMI GAZETE and put into effect. It was proposed that only the stamp fee be deducted from this compensation.

Whereas the percentage indemnification obtained by supervisory, health, and technical personnel is being set by the Council of Ministers, compensation paid to high-level administrators in respect to rank will have been determined by law. Accordingly, high-level officials at the first degree will receive 20 percent (12,000 liras); at the second degree, 15 percent (9,000 liras); and at the third degree, 10 percent (6,000 liras). However, the principle here is, "Not all first, second, and third degree civil servants will obtain this compensation." The principle behind compensation to be provided is the job being performed at the time.

Details of New Supplement Indices

Along with the new changes, supplement indices have been drawn up for several services. Details, by staff degrees, for service classes are cited in supplement tables that are newly introduced.

1. Educational Services

Staff Degree	Supplement Index	
	Previous	New
8-7	----	100
6-5	----	150
4	----	200
3	50	200
2	100	300
1	150	400

2. Technical Services Class

a. Those who possess the title of graduate engineer, engineer, graduate architect, architect, geologist, hydrogeologist, hydrologist, or

geophysicist who, under the statutes in effect, are graduates of faculties and higher schools that provide at least 4 years of continuous higher education are included in this group:

Staff Degree	Supplement	Index
	Previous	New
8-7	---	100
6-5	---	150
4-3	---	200
2	---	300
1	---	400

b. This group consists of those who are included in this class, but not in the section above.

Staff Degree	Supplement	Index
	Previous	New
3	---	50
2	---	100
1	---	200

3. Health Services Class

a. Those who possess the title of physician, medical specialist, dentist, pharmacist, and veterinary doctor as well as chemical engineers, chemists, graduates in chemistry, and biologists who are experts in basic branches of medicine in accordance with medical specialty regulations are included in this group.

Staff Degree	Supplement	Index
	Previous	New
8-7	---	100
6-5	---	150
4	---	200
3	---	300
2	---	400
1	---	500

b. This group consists of those who are included in this class, but not in the section above.

Staff Degree	Supplement	Index
	Previous	New
3	---	50
2	---	100
1	---	200

4. Education and Teaching Services Class

Staff Degree	Supplement	Index
	Previous	New
4	---	100
3	---	200
2	---	300
1	---	400

5. Attorney Services Class

Staff Degree	Supplement Index	
	Previous	New
8-7	---	100
6-5	---	150
4-3	---	200
2	---	300
1	---	400

6. Religious Services Class

Staff Degree	Supplement Index	
	Previous	New
3	---	50
2	---	100
1	---	200

7. Security Services Class

Those who have acquired the rank of security director are included in this class.

Staff Degree	Supplement Index	
	Previous	New
4	100	100
3	150	200
2	200	300
1	300	400
Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir security directors	400	500
Security director general	500	600

8. Civil Administration Authority Services Class

Staff Degree	Supplement Index	
	Previous	New
9-8	150	150
7-6	200	200
5-4	300	300
3-2	400	400
1	500	500
Undersecretaries, governors	600	600

Supplementary Compensation

On another hand, as a result of raising the minimum wage to 10,000 liras on 1 May 1981, those at the 11th through 15th degrees, because their salaries were less than the minimum wage, were paid "supplementary differences" so that their monthly wages would total 10,000 liras.

As a result of the new changes in the index table, a new opportunity has been ensured, in addition to the index table, to those whose monthly wages are below the minimum wage and who received a "supplementary difference" in order to obtain the minimum wage. Although the alteration of the inde-

table does not necessitate the "supplementary difference," it was proposed that separate compensation be given those at the 11th through 15th degrees so that they may benefit from the change.

It was decided to pay the following gross amounts only to personnel at the 11th through 15th degrees and monthly only until the end of the year:

The sum of 1,650 liras to the first level of the 15th degree; 1,502 liras to the second level; and 1,450 liras to the third level.

The sum of 1,350 liras to the first level of the 14th degree, 1,250 liras to the second level; and 1,150 liras to the third level.

The sum of 1,050 liras to the first level of the 13th degree, 950 liras to the second level; and 850 liras to the third level.

The sum of 750 liras to the first level of the 12th degree, 650 liras to the second level; and 550 liras to the third level.

The sum of 450 liras to the first level of the 11th degree; 300 liras to the second level; and 150 liras to the third level. These payments will "only be made until the end of the year." The reason for this is that, if "no time limit had been set," these amounts would have to be paid indefinitely. However, it states at the end of the index table that these payments "will be given in the form of a supplementary wage to those who receive less than the minimum wage."

Other Changes

In addition, judges' payments have been raised from 50 percent to 75 percent. It was proposed that a supplementary index as high as 400 be applied for lawyers who provide services to the state and that a special service compensation of up to a net 6,000 liras be given as well.

It was decided, "paying attention to the locale in which they are employed," to pay a net 6,000-lira site compensation fee in addition to the monthly wage supplement to chairmen of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal, the Council of State, the Audit Office, to the Supreme Court of Appeal attorney-general, and to the Council of State attorney-general.

Armed Forces

In the meantime, Turkish Armed Forces Personnel Law No 926, which was approved together with Law No 657 and which will go into effect 1 March, has been amended. Accordingly, the index table for armed forces personnel has been improved in parallel with that of civil servants. It was reported that, other than the general increases provided as in the case of civil servants, no other supplementary benefits have been added.

However, it was decided to pay site compensation, "paying attention to the locale in which they are employed," of a net 12,000 liras to the General Staff chairman and a net 9,000 liras to the gendarme commandant general.

Other Principles

In addition to the fiscal principles outlined in Law No 657, "several principles" have been adopted along with the new legal modifications.

Changes

[1.] The ministries of finance, health, labor, and social security is drafting a joint set of regulations for the purpose of ensuring disabled citizens the opportunity to become civil servants. This special law will acknowledge the opportunity for the handicapped to obtain positions in the public sector. The regulations will be published in the RESMI GAZETE in the days ahead.

[2.] In the past, if a civil servant was assigned to another post, it was categorically imperative for the order to pay for the move to come from Ankara, and the payment was made after the order was received. The civil servant was able to go to his new assignment only after he received the money. In the new system, if an order comes to assign a civil servant to a new locality, a special order for the payment (travel allowance) from Ankara does not need to be awaited. The payment can be made where he works immediately without waiting for an order to arrive, and the civil servant will be able to leave for his new assignment within 15 days.

[3.] A female civil servant will receive 3 weeks' maternity leave prior to the birth of her child and 6 weeks after the birth. In addition, she will be given a 1½-hour nursing leave per day for a 6-month period following the birth of her child.

[4.] If a civil servant is involved in any sort of attack while on the job, he will be given leave for the entire period of treatment.

New principles have been determined for appointments to positions at the first, second, third, and fourth degrees. Accordingly, civil servants have been placed in three groups for appointments to high-level posts and to these degrees.

The first group requires 15 years of public service for positions at the 1 plus 500 and higher degrees.

The second group requires 12 years of public service for the remaining levels of the first degree.

The third group requires 9 years of public service for positions at the third and fourth degrees.

Furthermore, two additional conditions are required in order to be eligible for each of the three groups. The candidate must have a college degree and must have earned the right to the position two degrees below that to which he will be promoted. For example, in order to become an undersecretary, director general, or deputy director general, it is necessary to have 15 years of public service, to possess a college degree, and to have attained the rank of the third degree.

Financial Cost

Officials report that the additional cost resulting from the newly adopted fiscal principles "has been accounted for in the budget that will have already been put into effect and will amount to approximately 95 billion liras."

The new fiscal changes that are to be published in tomorrow's issue of the RESMI GAZETE and, if necessary, additional regulations will be passed by the Council of Ministers within 15 days and will be ready to be put into effect on 1 March.

Retired civil servants will begin to benefit from the new index table as of 1 March.

New Indices for Armed Forces

In addition to the new index table to be implemented for civil servants who come under State Civil Servants Law No 657, the monthly-wage index table has been revised for Armed Forces Law No 926. The new table will also become effective 1 March 1982. The new index has been set at 1400.

Individual index tables for officers, noncommissioned officers, noncommissioned officers who have become officers, and specialist gendarme sergeants were approved by the National Security Council.

Retired Civil Servants' Monthly Stipend Supplement Index Table

1,400	+	50	for	1,120
1,400	+	100	for	1,150
1,400	+	150	for	1,180
1,400	+	200	for	1,210
1,400	+	300	for	1,270
1,400	+	400	for	1,330
1,400	+	500	for	1,390
1,400	+	600	for	1,450
1,400	+	650	for	1,480
1,400	+	700	for	1,510
1,400	+	800	for	1,570
1,400	+	900	for	1,630

Retired Civil Servants' Monthly Stipend New Index Table

Degree	Level								
	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>
1	970	1,010	1,050	1,090	-	--	-	-	-
2	865	900	935	970	1,010	1,050	-	-	-
3	775	805	835	865	900	935	970	1,010	-
4	700	725	750	775	805	935	865	900	935
5	640	660	680	700	725	750	775	805	835
6	595	610	625	640	660	680	700	725	750
7	550	565	580	595	610	625	640	660	680
8	520	530	540	550	565	580	595	610	625
9	490	500	510	520	530	540	550	565	580
10	460	470	480	490	500	510	520	530	540
11	440	445	450	460	470	480	490	500	510
12	425	430	435	440	445	450	460	470	480
13	410	415	421	425	430	435	440	445	450
14	435	400	405	410	415	420	425	430	435
15	380	385	390	395	400	405	410	415	420

New Monthly Salary Index Table for Officers

Degree Rank	Level								
	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>
1 Colonel, Staff Colonel									
General, Admiral	1400	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1 Lieutenant Colonel	1220	1280	1340	-	-	-	-	-	-
2 Senior Major	1055	1110	1165	1220	1280	1340	-	-	-
3 Major	920	965	1010	1055	1110	1165	1220	1280	-
4 Lieutenant Commander	815	850	885	920	965	1010	1055	1110	1165
5 Senior Captain	725	755	785	815	850	885	920	965	1010
6 Captain	650	675	700	725	755	785	815	850	885
7 First Lieutenant	590	610	630	650	675	700	725	755	785
8 Lieutenant	545	560	575	590	610	630	650	675	700
9 Second Lieutenant	500	515	530	545	560	575	590	610	630

Note: Graduates from a university faculty or a higher school who have studied a year longer than the period required by the War School will begin to serve as lieutenants at the second level of the eighth degree; 2 years longer, at the third level of the eighth degree; and 3 years longer, at the fourth level of the eighth degree.

Monthly Salary Index Table for Noncommissioned Officers Who Become Commissioned Officers

Degree Rank	Index	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
2 Lieutenant Commander	1165	1220	1280	1340	-	-	-	-	-	-
3 Senior Captain	1055	1110	1165	1220	1280	-	-	-	-	-
4 Captain	920	965	1010	1055	1110	-	-	-	-	-
5 First Lieutenant	815	850	885	920	965	-	-	-	-	-
6 Lieutenant	725	755	785	815	850	-	-	-	-	-

Monthly Salary Index Table for Noncommissioned Officers

Degree Rank	Level	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
2 Second Degree Senior Sergeant-Major	1055	1110	1165	1220	1280	1340	-	-	-	-
3 Degreed Senior Sergeant-Major	920	965	1010	1055	1110	1165	1220	1280	-	-
4 Senior Sergeant-Major	815	850	885	920	965	1010	1055	1110	-	-
5 Degreed Sergeant-Major	925	755	785	815	850	885	920	965	1010	-
6 Sergeant-Major	650	675	700	725	755	785	815	850	885	-
7 Senior Top-Sergeant	590	610	630	650	675	700	725	755	785	-
8 Top-Sergeant	545	560	575	590	610	630	650	675	700	-
9 Senior Sergeant	500	515	530	545	560	575	590	610	630	-
10 Sergeant	470	480	490	500	515	530	545	560	575	-

Monthly Salary Index Table for Specialist Gendarme Sergeants

Degree Rank	Level	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
5-6 Third Degree Sergeant	650	675	700	725	755	785	815	850	885	-
7 Senior Second Degree Sergeant	590	610	630	650	675	700	725	755	785	-
8 Second Degree Sergeant	545	560	575	590	610	630	650	675	700	-
9 Senior First Degree Sergeant	500	515	530	545	560	575	590	610	630	-
10 First Degree Sergeant	470	480	490	500	515	530	545	560	575	-
11 Senior Sergeant	440	450	460	470	480	490	500	515	530	-
12 Sergeant	425	430	435	440	450	460	470	480	490	-

Monthly Salary Index Table for Specialist Sergeants

Degree Rank	Level	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
11 Specialist Sergeant	440	450	460	470	480	490	500	515	530	-
12 Specialist Sergeant	425	430	435	440	450	460	470	480	490	-
13 Specialist Sergeant	410	415	420	425	430	435	440	450	460	-

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CSO: 4654/194

YAZAR INTERVIEWED ON STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN BUSINESS

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 9 Feb 82 p 4

[Interview with Mehmet Yazar, Turkish Union of Chambers Administrative Council chairman by Vecdi Sevig]

[Text] Turkish Union of Chambers Administrative Council Chairman Mehmet Yazar was asked to evaluate the 24 January decisions from the standpoint of their concordance with the monetary policy and decisions made in the public sector. Yazar, who answered DUNYA's questions on the subject, said that the 24 January decisions opened the door to structural changes in private sector operations and asserted that the public sector is experiencing difficulties in securing harmony with the 24 January decisions. Yazar claimed that the private sector will also pay the price for this dis-harmony of the public sector and stressed the need for both the private and public sectors to become open, in stages, to world competition.

[Question] The tight-money policy pursued following the 24 January decisions was among the policies most criticized. Firms' changing hands, firms' difficulties making payments, and, finally, the halting of investments were assessed as symptoms of the monetary stricture. What developments were brought about from the standpoint of monetary problems by the 24 January decisions?

[Answer] As is known, the most important goal of the stabilization measures taken at the beginning of 1980 was, first, to control the rate of inflation, which had reached very abnormal dimensions, and, then, to reduce it to a reasonable level. Inflation first reduced the value of the currency gradually and later caused all economic balances to be destroyed as a corollary of this. A general rule in an inflationary environment is that avoiding money becomes a common occurrence in all sectors of the community. In other words, it is very clear that to hold on to wealth in the form of currency is not an intelligent move when the currency loses 10 percent of its value every month. Every individual in the society considered spending every last cent in his possession and thought about how to compensate in another manner for the money's loss in value. What happened? Money was spent necessarily and unnecessarily. Goods were sold. Buildings were purchased. Plans were made to buy a second refrigerator for the house. In

short, because it was known that it was useless to retain money as currency, it was spent. Because money was spent on consumer goods or real estate rather than put into savings accounts in banks, the rate of increase in accounts in banks gradually fell. On the other hand, the situation in the business world was no different. From the beginning, investment firms are forced to operate on credit, because they have, in themselves, inadequate resources in general. In the inflationary environment, if there was the opportunity, it was deemed correct and natural for these organizations to turn their potential toward investments. They invested their money in goods, investments goods, and similar things. In doing so, they created an escape from inflation.

Furthermore, a different situation existed for operational facilities in that period. Because official interest rates that were applied were a great deal below official inflation figures at the time, because it was seen that, for example, the rate of inflation was 100 percent and the interest rate was 20 to 25 percent (I am quoting old figures), to obtain the maximum amount of credit and to make more investments with the credit obtained was profitable and was a rational move.

If an operation did not do this, it was not acting intelligently. The economic policy being pursued dictated that the operation do this. A manager or industrialist was a man who best utilized the potential existing in the hands of a businessman. He would not be an investor, a manager if he did not. There was another benefit, to a degree, from this situation. If the domestic money that truly came from past times or, in other words, if the value of domestic money and the interest rate had not been below that of inflation, a number of persons would probably have changed professions and would not have been industrialists, investors. Today, if we talk about industry at a certain point, there was a positive side to these policies in respect to the basic goal for industrialization development. Our operations attained the goal set under those conditions, which was to use resources in the best possible manner, and this was done naturally.

Because the rate-of-exchange policy also was established to keep the lira below true values in those days, managers set out to use, as much as they could, foreign exchange, which was cheap. This, too, was a correct move. Managers and industrialists were forced to use elements that could be considered rational within the economic policies of the nation in those days. In time, however, these practices resulted in a gradual reduction of private resources in the operations and an increase in the influence of foreign resources. With the 24 January decisions, first of all, a serious monetary-credit measure was taken and then the foreign currency rate of exchange, interest rates, and the domestic value of the currency were assigned their true values. In the face of this, installations were instantly confronted with all the problems of the domestic structure that had their roots in past years and that were dealt with poorly by the general economic policies of the day. What happened then? Industry, which was laden with a huge interest and rate-of-exchange burden on top of its large domestic and foreign

burden, skidded to a halt on the domestic market. Therefore, following the 24 January decisions, in addition to the goal of controlling inflation, goals were set to reduce the huge deficit in the foreign balance of payments, slowly draw installations into the rules of the free market, and, most importantly, open our installations to the outside world. These goals, which were goals that were, in general, extraordinarily accurate from the economic standpoint, immediately pushed our operations, which were confronted with heavy burdens within the domestic structure as a result of the cheap credit and cheap foreign exchange policies pursued in the past in particular, into a bewildering period of unpreparedness. Our facilities, as a result of this, expended a great deal of effort to eliminate this imbalance in the domestic structure and did so in the face of rapidly increasing interest rates and in the face of heavy debts and their accompanying interest charges and expenses. Some took measures to increase private resources. Some increased capital to a large extent. This has been seen in the past 2 years in particular. Shares in some firms changed hands.

Despite all these efforts, problems in the structure of corporations continued to exist taking on various appearances depending upon the situation of the corporation. Firms and factories were able to be classified through these measures. A portion became directed more rapidly toward exportation and compensated for the tightening up of the domestic market with sales on the foreign market. This, too, was a healthy development. In other words, structural changes in some corporations were healthy changes in general. They included putting more emphasis on exportation, increasing private resources, finding new resources, and even, in some cases, changing hands. Institutions were, henceforth, forced to ensure harmony with conditions required by the free market, with conditions in order to become open to world competition, and they did so. The year, 1981, was a year of great effort in this respect for corporations. The private sector emerged from this struggle successful. There were a great deal of problems, and these problems still exist. In fact, several institutions were in danger of closing, and some declared bankruptcy. In general, however, we can see that desperate efforts were expended in order to succeed in making healthy structural change.

As a matter of fact, the increase in our exportation is the best example of this. The change in our private resources is another good example. These efforts will continue in 1982. I hope and believe that these changes will be able to succeed without producing loss or harm. At a point at which the private sector is in harmony with the model for the new economic approaches introduced in Turkey and at which healthy structural change is ensured in some installations and factories, I wish to say that the private sector, in truth, has attained this harmony with the situation by engaging in a struggle that surpassed expectations.

[Question] You summarized developments prior to and following the 24 January decisions from the standpoint of the private sector. What developments took place in regard to the public sector?

[Answer] What a pity it is that the public sector has remained far behind in harmonizing with the new economic situation during the past 2 years. It is the basic source of our economic problems today. Look and you will see that the KIT's [Public Economic Enterprise] have not taken a serious step toward rational operations. The price mechanism alone is used. Because a number of KIT products are monopoly items, because there is no competition, they are even more comfortable. What a pity it is that public services are expensive and ineffective. In other words, the state has not been able to achieve concord with this new economic model, with the KIT's, with state services, with the bureaucracy. The basic policy of the state is, in fact, to attain this harmony. All upper-level administrators are of this understanding.

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CSO: 4654/194

INDUSTRIAL CHAMBER SIGNALS ECONOMIC DANGERS

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 5 Feb 82 p 6

[Text] It is generally agreed that the economic policy being implemented in Turkey since 24 January 1980 has been successful in curbing inflation and spurring exports and that, however, it has been inadequate from a viewpoint of revitalizing industrial output and investments in particular. Meanwhile, it is observed that the capital and intermediary goods industries--which are very important for industrialization--have suffered most among the sectors that have been pushed into crisis as a result of a weak domestic market and dwindling investments.

The January 1982 special issue of the Bulletin of the Eskisehir Chamber of Industry [ECI] draws attention to this perilous course and says: "If Turkey abandons its capital and intermediary goods industries--which are the real industries--it will be abandoning its industrialization nad development effort and it will never be possible to correct this mistake."

The article entitled "Turkish Economy 1981 to 1982: Evaluation and Expectations" appearing in the ECI Bulletin states that industrial output in 1981 was to a certain degree higher than that of 1980 which was very low. The article adds, however, that the 1981 industrial output still remained low compared to the pre-inflation period as a result of inadequate levels of working capital, a weak domestic market and large inventories. The article continues:

"In 1981, the average industrial capacity utilization ratio stood at 50 to 60 percent. This ratio is higher than that of 1980 but lower than those of the pre-inflation years. However, if one looks at the distribution of the capacity utilization ratio among the sectors it is seen that the lowest capacity utilization ratios occurred in the captial and intermediary goods sectors."

Stating that the continuing decline in investments is adversely affecting the demand for capital and intermediary goods, the article stresses that an industrialization policy based solely on exports will not solve Turkey's problems. The article says:

"It is impossible to build up export industries without going through a period of import restrictions. Having in mind that it will be even harder to procure

foreign credit in the next few years, the implementation of an industrialization strategy which will not neglect exports and which will be based on the production of capital and intermediary goods is inevitable for a sound economic development. Investments in capital and intermediary goods industries may revitalize the domestic market and create employment without inflationary effects. In the long run, capital and intermediary goods will have better export chances."

Abandoning Real Industries

Another article appearing in the ECI Bulletin and written by ECI Executive Council Member Servet Ayzeren criticizes the fact that new economic decisions leave unprotected steel, chemical, machinery and intermediary goods industries which form the backbone of heavy and integrate industry in our country. The article says:

"Although opening the capital and intermediary goods industries to foreign competition is admittedly a desirable goal, it must be understood that opening our toddling industries to foreign competition without allowing them to develop themselves and without providing them with adequate capital and competent personnel will mean annihilating the capital and intermediary goods industries."

"If Turkey abandons its capital and intermediary goods industries--which are the real industries--it will be abandoning its industrialization and development effort and it will never be possible to correct this mistake. Like the old saying, "we are killing when just trying to hit." In trying to correct some faulty industries we are abandoning all our industries and integrated installations and taking a path that may take us to a perilous end. In a world where even the most powerful economies often take measures to protect their industries, opening Turkey's developing capital and intermediary goods industries to foreign competition will constitute a heavy blow to industrialization efforts."

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MAJOR BUSINESS GROUP TURNS TO 'OIL BARTER' SYSTEM

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 13 Feb 82 p 6

[Text] In a speech given a short time ago in Istanbul, Minister of State and Deputy Prime Minister Turgut Ozal said that Turkey must not be too overjoyed by a rollback in oil prices. The story behind these words is this. Turkey's "foreign sales explosion" in 1981 came about, to a great extent, by an increase in foreign sales to petroleum-producing nations. A reduction in these countries' revenues and, consequently, in their purchasing power can have a negative effect on Turkey's "foreign sales explosion."

Looking at figures from January through November 1980 and 1981, it can be seen that about two-thirds of Turkey's increase in foreign sales in the first 11 months of 1981 was to oil-producing countries. Whereas Turkey's sales to seven oil countries rose 337 percent during this period, its total foreign sales increased by 65 percent. It was noted that foreign sales to Libya climbed 671 percent; to Saudi Arabia, 436 percent; and to Iraq, 326 percent.

It is for this reason that Turkey, which directs a large proportion of its foreign sales to oil-producing nations, cannot be excessively pleased by a fall in oil prices. This occurrence forces Turkish exporters and businessmen as well as officials to develop new measures in order to continue to make sales to petroleum-producing countries.

Oil Barter System

Barter is one of the methods being considered. This plan was first devised by the Kozanoglu-Cavusoglu (KC) Group, which has intensive relations with Libya and Iraq, and was a topic of discussion with Libya. Accordingly, oil, which will be purchased from Libya based on the current posted price, will be sold on the "spot" market at an approximate 7-percent loss. This percentage will fluctuate depending on developments on the spot market. Libya will sell oil to the KC Group with a monthly letter of credit. In exchange, it will buy goods from Turkey, also with a monthly letter of credit, valued at the price of the oil sold. As for the difference between the high purchase price and the cheap sales price of the oil, this will be met by price margins on goods sold to Libya at about world prices.

Hisarbank Director General Ahmet Demirer reported that the oil-barter agreement proposed with Libya will be able to generate a \$700,000-volume of business per year based on an average of 50,000 barrels of oil per day. Demirer claimed that, if this operation does take place, Turkey will be able to sell Libya wheat worth \$350 million, barley worth \$180 million, sugar worth \$120 million, and tea as well. He pointed out that there are great difficulties in instituting such an operation and said that the same type of procedure with Nigeria and Algeria is being considered.

Purchases from Libya

Director General Demirer of Hisarbank, which is affiliated with the KC Group, reported that, thanks to the oil-barter operation which is being initiated this month with Libya, Turkish firms that have money owed them by Libya will have the opportunity to obtain it within a short time. Demirer noted that firms that wish to take advantage of this opportunity may do so by paying the KC Group, which will suffer an approximate 7-percent loss from the barter of oil, an additional 2.75-percent service fee for a total fee of 9.75 percent. He said that agreements on this subject have been reached with two large exporting firms to date and that, if interest is shown by other firms that are owed money, a total value of \$150 million in exports, \$90 million of which is documented exportation, can be obtained within a short time. Demirer stressed that other banks and groups will only be pleased by this type of procedure. He said, "For this reason, even large Japanese trade corporations such as Marubeni have begun to show interest in us. This operation will only bring benefits to our country."

Central Bank, Reactions

In the meantime, it was learned that the Republic of Turkey Central Bank is proceeding to reckon in an account Turkey's oil debt to Libya and the money it owes our exporters. Officials of various firms which have intensive relations with Libya and which have reacted to the enterprise of the KC Group say that, rather than paying a 9.75-percent fee, they will set up a similar operation themselves.

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CSO: 4654/195

BUSINESSMEN, ACADEMICIANS OPTIMISTIC OVER 1982 PROSPECTS

Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 1 Jan 82 p 5

[Text] The measures for economic stability taken on 24 January 1980 have yielded important results during 1981. Inflation has dropped to below 40 percent. Following these developments, what are the things that 1982 can bring to the Turkish economy? Businessmen and scientists have expressed their views concerning this topic. Their consensus is that 1982 will be a better year than 1981.

Businessmen and scientists have stated that the continued implementation of measures for economic stability as well as the elimination of certain shortcomings inherent in these measures could make it possible for inflation to drop to 25 percent in 1982. They also stressed the need for measures to alleviate the burden that is currently being shouldered by wage earners. The views of businessmen and professors for the year 1982 may be summarized as follows:

Professor Memduh Yasa, member of the teaching staff at the Faculty of Economics: "The Turkish economy is emerging from 1981 with cures for a significant portion of its functional as well as structural ailments. 1981 was a year during which the measures of 24 January 1980 could be fully implemented. It cannot be said that such a strong treatment program was implemented without any hardship. Several enterprises and even some fields of production are undergoing significant perturbations. It is becoming clear that they will continue to undergo such perturbations. We feel that this should be viewed as natural. This is because our economy is undergoing structural changes. These changes must run their course if the economy is to avoid similar ailments in the future. The results which have been obtained during the year 1981 have provided workability to our economy as well as beginning to change its structure in a healthy manner. What are the expectations for 1982? Let me be quick to point out that it is not correct to abandon to their own devices those enterprises and fields of production that are suffering from the implementation of current policy. They should be considered on an individual basis and measures should be taken to facilitate their adaptation to new conditions. Policy principles should not be sacrificed in the process. Moreover, the broad outlines of the new structure into which the economy is being placed should be very well defined. In other words, objectives should be clear. The measures that remained incomplete during 1980 and 1981 should be completed in 1982."

Nuh Kusulu, President of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce: "I am of the belief that during 1982 various shortages can be alleviated and the successful resolution of economic problems can be expedited as well as facilitated through the adoption of certain measures which will not constitute a deviation from the overall economic policy that is currently being followed. In the course of the period that we currently face, we should expend our efforts in the direction of encouraging institutionalization, creating sources of self financing, reducing problems of financing and increasing the tempo of the rate by which our exports are growing. In what concerns exports we should focus with insistence upon increasing export credits, the surmounting of bureaucratic obstacles and a temporary tax exemption for all export related activities. I can state that if the measures of 24 January 1980 were to be bolstered with the new measures that I have outlined above, the economy will begin to revitalize itself and national income for next year might somewhat exceed national income for this year."

Professor Doctor Unal Tekinalp, member of the teaching staff at the Faculty of Law, said the following: "The policy of combating inflation which has been implemented since 1980 has given its first positive results in 1981. It cannot be said that this policy, which is beneficial to the national economy and to the people, has been able to solve or will be able to solve by itself the problems that are faced by those with limited incomes. While it was expected that modifications brought to various tax laws in 1981 would improve the position of wage earners, this has unfortunately not taken place. It is undoubtedly true that the policy has led to shortages in the industrial and commercial sectors. Nevertheless, difficult times such as these require that a difficult burden be assumed. Those who have criticized the policy and exposed its dangerous aspects have not been able to propose better solutions. During 1982, everyone will continue to be affected by the same difficulties. In other words, 1982 will be a difficult year. Even a further drop in the rate of inflation will not lessen the difficulties confronted by wage earners. For this reason, it is imperative that measures be taken in 1982 to provide at least some relief to this group and that changes be brought to tax laws for the purpose of lessening the burden on wage earners."

Halit Soydan, General Director of "Yapi ve Kredi" bank: "With the more than 50 percent increase in foreign currency revenues for 1981, our country has begun to collect the fruits of measures for stability, realistic foreign exchange policy, and steps to encourage as well as support exportation. What can be expected of 1982? The restoration of internal and external economic equilibriums that have been upset will constitute a fundamental objective that will shape the new year. The policies of tight credit, tight money and high interest on capital will continue to be implemented. The rate of inflation will continue to decline. Exports and imports will increase while remittances by workers employed abroad as well as foreign currency earnings brought to the country by Turkish constructors will expand to represent a greater contribution. Investments will become more concentrated in industrial fields related to energy and agriculture. New developments will be obtained in the (KIT) project which is designed for the purpose of increasing the efficacy of State Economic Enterprises."

Sarik Tara, President of the Board of Directors of ENKA Holding: "I estimate that the foreign orders that we receive during 1982 will reach 15 billion or even 20 billion dollars. An additional 100 thousand Turkish citizens will find jobs in the Middle East. This figure is twice the number of workers that can be provided employment by private and official organizations in Turkey during one year. I believe that as is required for a healthy Turkish economy, inflation will drop to below 25 percent. Foreign currency revenues will reach 12 billion dollars. New foreign and domestic resources will become available to industry which is suffering from an imbalance in capital. While tax rates will decrease in 1982, there will be an increase in tax revenues. The budget will be one that is balanced. As long as the policy for stability continues to be implemented (and we are of the opinion that this should be the case) the problems of the Turkish economy will be resolved to a great extent. This will rescue us from pressures exerted by foreign circles during difficult days such as these. 1982 will be a good year."

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SEVIG SURVEYS BASIC ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 22 Feb 82 p 8

[Article by Veysi Sevig]

[Text] Looking at Turkey's economic situation at the beginning of 1982, what attracts attention is that several negative developments are gaining significance. In particular, the fact that positive progress in the agricultural sector could not be obtained in 1981 comes to the forefront of the topics that must be discussed. In 1981, fishing showed a 7.7-percent increase and forestry, a 3.3-percent increase while farming and animal husbandry's growth was 0.3 percent, a negligible amount. Taking into account the increase in population that resulted in this degree of development and the significant proportion of agricultural products that went into our foreign sales, reality becomes extremely thought-provoking.

Because of a slowdown in our agricultural productivity, the claim that was defended and held up for praise for years -- that we are able to feed ourselves adequately -- is about to lose its validity. For this reason, the future of this subject and the related problems that may arise must not be put out of our minds. According to calculations that have been made, our self-sufficiency that exists today will continue for another 5 or 6 years at the most. In fact, foreign purchases of wheat and vegetable oil in the past year clearly emphasize the importance of the subject.

It is a reality that production is not being carried out adequately in our country from the standpoint of agriculture. There is still no regional production planning and implementation in our country. Producers make their own slaughtering schedules and, in general, adjust the use of their productive land according to base prices. This situation prevents stable development in our agricultural productivity.

From the standpoint of ensuring economic stability on the domestic market, it can appear beneficial to obtain some agricultural products through foreign purchases. However, this type of action affects the use of existing agricultural production capacity at the national level. Therefore, there are countless economic benefits in developing agricultural production within the framework of a program.

The belief that agricultural production's value will be set according to the rules of a free market has still not produced a positive result in our country. As is known, a very large proportion of our citizens involved in agricultural production in rural areas are economically powerless. As an inevitable result of this, middlemen, who serve absolutely no economic use, come between the producer and the market. Authoritarian prices which are sometimes set too low and the reduction by the middleman sector of the money that comes into the producer's hands for his goods have become reasons for the abandonment of the agricultural sector.

Turkey's future, as was its past, is very much dependent upon agricultural production and development. Because of its geographical structure, our country is able to take part in a wide variety of agricultural production and, at the same time, develop a wide-ranging employment sector. Until industrialization is complete, existing potential must be wisely utilized from the standpoint of both ensuring sufficient agricultural production and of reducing the number of unemployed.

On another hand, the housing shortage in our country is gradually increasing. It is expected that the gap will be even larger in 1982. The law enacted in order to construct mass housing has still not produced desired results. The number of families that earn a specific income and that are unable to obtain housing today constitutes a majority of our citizens who are without housing. In fact, while it was possible to say, up until 10 years ago, that, with some difficulty, every family had the chance to possess a home, today this opportunity has diminished.

It is necessary to bear in mind, when looking for a solution to the housing problem, the number of families created each year. Every newly established family unit adds to the need for a separate housing unit. If a sufficient amount of housing cannot be produced, rental fees on existing housing increases.

The housing shortage felt in Turkey at this time has become similar to that experienced from time to time in western countries. Methods used in order to tax empty units in those countries have, for some reason or other, not been able to be employed in our country. From another standpoint, tax breaks that would encourage the procurement of housing have not been considered from the standpoint of wage earners. Yet, the gradually increasing housing shortage is becoming of more interest to and is affecting low-income families.

It is necessary to assess the direction the Turkish economy is taking from the standpoint of the future of agriculture and housing, because food and shelter are two basic elements required in everyday life.

11673
CSO: 4654/195

CANTURK GIVES DETAILS OF 1982 IMPORT PROGRAM

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 6 Jan 82 p 4

[Text] Minister of Commerce Kemal Canturk has held a press conference in which he discussed the fundamentals of the 1982 import program which was announced in yesterday's edition of RESMI GAZETE.

Canturk announced that total imports worth 10 billion dollars are being anticipated for 1982. He said: "Our import program for the year 1982 has been prepared in a manner that provides for a framework to promptly bring about this importation, a mentality that will reduce import formalities, and a commitment to the handling of our imports under more liberal conditions."

Canturk noted that the new import program provides for the establishment of a fund that will have the objectives of eliminating material shortages that adversely influence price stability as well as the removal of speculative factors. Canturk also said that payments into this fund in amounts yet to be determined will make possible the easy importation of twelve products, including coffee.

In summary, Minister of Commerce Canturk said the following as he discussed foreign trade developments for the year 1981:

"1981 has been a successful year for our economy. Our National Income which had decreased for two consecutive years in 1979 and 1980, will exceed previously planned growth by registering a 4.4 percent increase for the year 1981. In comparison to the corresponding period for last year, our exports have shown a 65 percent increase and reached 4,047 million (4.047 billion) dollars. I can easily say that our exports by the end of the year will reach and even exceed the 4,500 million (4.5 billion) dollar mark. We are expecting our imports to amount to 8.8 billion dollars. For the year 1981 our exports will be equivalent to 52 percent of our imports."

In summary, Minister of Commerce Canturk continued as follows:

"Our import program for 1982 expands upon Deregulation List Number 1 and adds 40 new kinds of products to this list. Also, we consider the new opportunity for the importation of coffee to be a significant event. It has also been decided to prevent importers from obtaining excessive profits in the period

remaining before the fall of internal prices. For this purpose, a fee will be levied on such imports. The products that will be subject to the fee have been determined as follows: raw coffee, corn, soybeans, margarine, raw oils, raw cocoa beans, residues of crushed seeds, cast iron, various ordinary window glasses, alloys of iron and silicon, single arc electrodes, and iron alloys. These products will be freely imported through the payment of fees in amounts yet to be determined. For this purpose, import taxes have been lowered for certain products which have in the past been protected by very high customs duties. Another significant development brought about by our import program involves the foreign currency earnings of our exporters and export oriented industrialists. Exporters will now have the opportunity of depositing 5 percent of the foreign currency earnings that they are not required to bring into the country, into a foreign currency account at the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. Deposits will be restricted to 40,000 dollars per year. These funds will be available for the importation of products listed on Deregulation Lists numbered 1 and 2."

In explaining the bureaucratic shortcuts that have been introduced, Minister of Commerce Kemal Canturk said the following:

"The validity period for authorization certificates has been extended. These documents will be extendable for a period of one month. The commodity exchange committee has been abolished. Our ministry will assume the handling of such requests in the future. Industrialists will be able to meet urgent import needs through unconditional imports of up to 5000 dollars. A mere declaration will be sufficient for these imports. Last year's ceiling for such imports was 3000 dollars. The principle of partial refunds of import guarantees has been adopted. The circulation of products that have been removed from Deregulation List Number 1 has been left to the discretion of industrialists. Products that have been brought to customs in 1981 on the basis of previously obtained import licenses but that for various reasons could not be imported will now be importable. The stipulations of Law 2419 will still remain in effect in case of these products."

9491
CSO: 4654/129

SCOPE OF EXPORTS INCENTIVES BROADENED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 10 Feb 82 p 10

[Text] Ankara--The "Export Incentives Directive" prepared by the Incentives and Implementation Department [IID] of the State Planning Organization went into effect yesterday after being published in the Official Gazette.

The directive was prepared with the aim of simplifying and expediting formalities and reducing red tape. The directive brings the following export incentive measures:

- Tax and fee exemption and interest rate differentials in export loans;
- Loans from the Export Incentive Fund;
- Foreign currency appropriation in return for actual or future exports;
- Foreign currency transfer facilities such as higher priority in foreign currency transfers, deductions from foreign currency earned from exports and transfer rights for actual exports;
- Customs tax exemption on raw and auxiliary goods and packaging materials;
- Import rights on an interim acceptance basis in accordance with Article 118 of the Customs Law.

According to the directive, industrialists who can guarantee their exports through specified third parties will be eligible to receive indirectly foreign currency, worth up to 60 percent of the value of the exports they have guaranteed, to import raw and auxiliary materials. The amount of foreign currency to be appropriated by an export incentive document--for the purchase of investment goods, such as machinery and equipment, needed by the companies involved--will not exceed 50 percent of the net FOB value of the export the company has guaranteed. Foreign currency appropriated after the actualization of the export will not exceed 50 percent of the amount remaining after the deduction of foreign currency appropriated previously by an export incentive document for a given export commodity.

The foreign currency appropriated in return for exports will be used through a bank credit account. The amount of foreign currency that can be used from the

foreign currency previously guaranteed and brought into the country will not exceed 50 percent of the amount remaining after the deduction of the foreign currency previously appropriated by an export incentive document from the amount guaranteed and brought into the country.

Export Incentive Fund

Ninety percent of the guarantees provided within the framework of the import regime will be transferred to the "Export Incentive Fund" account at the Central Bank. Exporters will receive loans from this fund. Loans given from the fund will have a maximum maturity period of 1 year.

The directive exempts packaging materials to be used on export goods from customs taxes and gives the authority to implement the "interim acceptance system" to the IID which will file requests for interim imports with or without waivers. The interim import period has been set at 6 months and the interim export period at 12 months.

--If public or private corporations involved in housing construction sell a housing unit to citizens working abroad with no obligation to bring the foreign currency they have earned to Turkey, that sale will be counted as an export.

--Contracting, consulting and engineering services sold abroad as well as similar services earning foreign currency will be counted as exports and will benefit from the incentive measures on condition that the persons or corporations involved receive export incentive documents.

--It will be possible to clear unguaranteed commercial debts by extra manufacturing through foreign currency appropriations.

Export Periods

The export declared and guaranteed in the export incentive document must be realized within the period specified in the document. This period will not exceed 12 months. According to the directive, allowable periods for documented and waivered exports of industrial goods, minerals, quarry products, fresh fruit and vegetables and marine products will generally be 8 months.

According to the directive, until an export insurance system is instituted the IID will handle export insurance procedures by amounts to be transferred by the Money-Credit Council from the "Supports and Price Stability Fund" to the Export Incentives Fund based on guidelines set by the said Council and within the framework of the export incentive document.

9588

CSO: 4654/172

AGREEMENT WITH BULGARIAN YOUTH SIGNED

Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 24 Mar 82 pp 1, 7

/Excerpts/ The firm solidarity of the Dimitrov Communist Youth Union with the Cypriot people and youth for a peaceful and just solution to the Cyprus problem is repeated in a protocol for cooperation recently signed in Sofia between EDON /United Democratic Youth Organization/ and the Dimitrov Communist Youth Union.

An announcement of the EDON central council states that on the invitation of the Dimitrov Communist Youth Union, an EDON delegation, composed of Dimitrios Khristofias, secretary general, Kostas Themistokleous, secretary for international relations and the cultural section, and Andreas Avgoustis, member of the central council, paid an official visit to the People's Republic of Bulgaria on 14-20 March.

The Cypriot delegation had talks with the secretariat of the sister organization, headed by First Secretary Stanka Siopova, and culminated with the signing of a protocol for cooperation between the two countries.

The protocol, covering the period 1982-1983, makes an appraisal of the international situation, describes the position of the two organizations on the Cyprus issue, appraises the development of socialism in Bulgaria and lists the specific measures that will strengthen even more the relations of the two organizations.

Exchanges

With relation to cooperation, the two organizations arrived at the following:

- To exchange experiences and information on their activities, as well as publications, materials and other printed matter on their activities.
- To contribute to the development of bilateral tourist exchanges.

The Dimitrov Communist Youth Union invites:

1. A two-member EDON delegation to participate in the 14th Dimitrov Communist Youth Union and the "G. Dimitrov and Youth" international meet in May 1982.

2. Five EDON representatives to take part in the annual cadres seminar.
3. A family of an executive cadre to vacation at the "G. Dimitrov" international center, once a year.
4. Five children and one official to attend the encampment of "G. Dimitrov" pioneers during school vacation, in Kranevo, once a year.
5. An EDON representative to take part in the Sixth "Allen Mac" Political Song Festival, 1983.

The EDON invites:

1. A Dimitrov Communist Youth Union delegation, headed by the central committee first secretary, for an official visit to Cyprus.
2. A Dimitrov Communist Youth Union delegation to take part in the G. Dimitrov centennial celebration in Cyprus.
3. A Dimitrov Communist Youth Union delegation to participate in the International Volunteer Work Encampment, summer of 1982.
4. A Dimitrov Communist Youth Union delegation to attend the Ninth Pancypriot Youth and Student Festival, 30 July-1 August 1982.
5. A Dimitrov Communist Youth Union delegation to attend the Ninth EDON congress, 1983.

5671
CSO: 4621/280

PAME WITHDRAWS FROM COOPERATION WITH AKEL-DIKO

Nicosia O AGON in Greek 25 Mar 82 p 8

/Text/ The embryonic AKEL-DIKO /Democratic Party/-PAME [Pancyprian Renewal Party] front has split up following the definitive withdrawal of the third candidate "partner", Mr Khrysostomos Sofianos.

The split was revealed yesterday on the occasion of an announcement by the PAME executive office in which it proclaims the party's disengagement from the 8-month long deliberations for the attainment of "democratic cooperation and unity" and which emphasizes that "for the present, the conditions for such unity do not exist."

The PAME announcement states the following:

"The PAME executive office, on the basis of the latest decision of the party central committee, met on 23 March 1982 and unanimously arrived at the following conclusions and decisions:

"1. PAME, believing in the need for democratic cooperation and unity, deliberated on that issue for nearly 8 months.

"2. During the deliberations, PAME undertook sincere and impartial attempts for broad cooperation of democratic forces on a minimum program that would contain effective guarantees for their complete and true implementation, with the goal being the qualitative change needed by the country.

"3. Objective data available up to now show that for the time being conditions for any such unity do not exist.

"4. Consequently, PAME is disengaging itself from the process of these deliberations that have led to an impasse, not through its fault.

"5. PAME will determine its position on the presidential elections at the proper time."

5671
CSO: 4621/280

ERRORS, AMBIGUITIES IN PS THIRD WORLD POLICY EXAMINED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 22 Feb 82 pp 1, 2

[Text] At the moment when the 24th Congress of the PCF [French Communist Party] again stated the absolute priority which it assigns to its membership in the international communist movement, it was good for the Socialist Party in turn to restate its irrevocable condemnation of the "socialism of the East."

This kind of statement certainly was not such as to eliminate the contradiction in which the socialist administration was caught since it agreed to allow into its midst some of the French supporters of that socialism of the East.

Nor is it enough to clear the president of the republic of charges of having suffered in silence a situation in which a party such as the PCF, which is, if not the ruling party, then at least a party in the administration (according to the distinction drawn by Roland Leroy), continues symbolically to place the communist delegates from the Antilles and from Reunion in the publications of its congress among the "foreign delegations." On top of all that, the president of the republic of course is responsible for national integrity and sovereignty.

But, having stated these reservations, the Socialist Party's declaration was rather welcome: Why was it then necessary for two reports to come out so soon thereafter, reports which rather singularly reduced its positive meaning or even ridiculed it?

Here is the first bit of information: Regis Debray, advisor to the president of the republic on foreign affairs, made a fact-finding trip to Pakistan to study the problem of the Afghan refugees there; at the end of his trip, he devoted 2 weeks to a journey to the capitals of the ASEAN countries, followed by a visit to Hanoi, still of course to study the problem of refugees--this time the Indochinese refugees.

It is nice enough to be informed of this, considering what this program means. The choice made by the president of the republic in picking Regis Debray as his advisor on Latin American affairs already had caused some confusion and, here and there, even anxiety. It so happens that Debray, when he took his place in the group around Francois Mitterrand--long before the latter took high office--in a very explicit manner expressed the greatest severity toward the PCF.

On the other hand, he, who was first of all a militant in the international field, never found the time to come out with a similar condemnation of Soviet socialism and even less of Cuban socialism.

How could one think it proper to send a man on a government mission concerning Indochinese refugees who, less than 3 years ago, had talked with Noam Chomsky about the "Western delirium" in connection with the Pol Pot regime; it seemed to him then that the West "needed that bugaboo, that foil."¹

What should one think of that old theoretician of revolutionary guerrilla war who went to the Afghan border only to visit the refugee camps there, thus claiming to be unaware that there is an Afghan resistance, that there are Afghan guerrilla fighters who perhaps might have as much need of French aid, as we are told, the guerrillas in El Salvador have; but it is true that the Afghans are fighting against the Red Army?

The second report deals with Latin America: A delegation from the Socialist Party had gone to Cuba and Nicaragua during the second half of February.

Cuba and Nicaragua

To Cuba? The president of the republic in Paris with reason takes care not to receive Konstantin Cherenko in person but his party feels the need to get "clarification" on Cuba's foreign policy from Castro, "especially regarding its relations with the USSR." After all, do not Cuba and Vietnam spring from "socialism of the East?" Are they unaware that Cuba is a full member of CEMA? Are they unaware that, without being a member of the Warsaw Pact forces (for the time being limited to the homogeneous geographic grouping of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe because of the technical restrictions connected with infrastructure facilities and military logistic support), Cuba dispatched its defense minister to the Pact's Council of Defense Ministers who together prepared the process for Polish normalization?

To Nicaragua? Must the PS in a docile fashion follow the mistakes of the Socialist International whose top bodies, like all poorly controlled supranational bureaucracies of that kind, are exposed to all of the pressures, infiltrations, and manipulations? How long will the PS--following in the footsteps of the Socialist International--play the role of sorcerer's apprentice, and think that it must, as the third thief, grab the portion which the two superpowers are quarreling over, the same superpowers which it has decreed were empires equally in decline? Must we recall that there are authoritative personalities who in vain keep sounding warnings--personalities who are as socialist as anybody else but who are more concerned and better placed to see what the game is all about? Is it, for example, so difficult to realize what, in his moderate and skillful language, the elected president of the only Central American democracy, the Costa Rican social democrat Luis Alberto Monge--who resolutely fought against the dictatorship of Somoza--observed starting with his first declaration: "The revolutionary process in Nicaragua is being lined up along the Havana-Moscow axis." So, it is being lined up? Well, yes, first of all in a field which indicates the complete adoption of the orthodox Marxist-Leninist scheme, that is, the priority buildup of an army to the detriment of any economic reconstruction; in that devastated country, the army, under the

Sandinista regime, grew from 8,000 to 30,000 men, with tanks, aircraft, and missiles in proportion.

Hidden Evidence

Do we have to draw a picture? People sometimes get the desperate impression that the French Socialist Party is incapable of grasping the most elementary facts regarding the current operation of the worldwide communist system, for example, those marking the eventual switch of a country from the category of "socialist-oriented state" to the category of "socialist state." The term "socialist-oriented state" was selected by the communist movement to describe countries--such as, for example, Madagascar or the Congo, in Africa--which have not yet reached the stage where membership in the pro-Soviet sphere of socialism is considered--by Moscow, which has this capacity for judgment--to be irreversible. A de facto state where most often the autochthonous government nevertheless is not the product of an authentically communist party, no matter how much it may already conform to the socialist model in terms of its domestic social and economic policies, no matter how much it may already be subjected to the interests of Soviet diplomatic and military strategy.

Only those countries to which Moscow awards the official classification of "socialist states"--even though they may reveal certain variations that may be justified by geopolitical position or their more or less senior position in that sphere--are authorized to enjoy the complete backing of the Community of Socialist States and of the first among them, the USSR--that is, their membership in the family is accepted as irreversible and triggers, in case of danger, the "solidarity" plans of action, which derive from socialist internationalism. Cuba has crossed this threshold, Nicaragua and perhaps Angola undoubtedly are very close to crossing it.

One would hope that the PS would reflect on what was written recently, in three decisive phrases, by the most respected among sociological specialists of Latin America, Francois Bourricaud: "It is not true that underdevelopment can be completely blamed on the rapaciousness of the multinationals. It is not true that the liberation movements are spontaneous reactions to the exploitation of the local oligarchies and of American capitalism. It is not true that increased international aid would suffice to solve the problems of underdevelopment." "Third Worldism," concluded Bourricaud, "is suspect in our eyes not only because of its intellectual indigence but also because of the facilities it offers to the Soviets."²

FOOTNOTES

1. CHANGE, No 38; LA MACHINE A CONTER, October 1979, p 110.
2. COMMENTAIRE, No 16, p 571.

5058
CSO: 3100/451

PCF MINISTERS' STRATEGY TO REGAIN INFLUENCE VIEWED

Paris LE MATIN in French 12 Feb 82 p 12

[Article by Alain Touraine: "The Rope and the Poison"]

[Text] The 24th Congress of the Communist Party was prepared and took place amid general indifference because the party at this time cannot adopt any major political decisions. It is in the socialist administration, after having furiously attacked the PS for 3 years, not because it had changed its policies but because it had no choice. It is difficult to see how the situation could turn out to be favorable for it in the future and could offer it any new choices. This is the viewpoint explained by Alain Touraine.

Either the Communist Party will remain under the protective and stifling wing of the PS and continue to become weaker, because it is to the credit of the PS that positive changes have been achieved, or it will go back into the opposition and will appear as the party that brought the left down, as was the case in 1978 and as could have been the case in 1981. Aware that these two prospects are equally unfavorable for it, the PCF is thinking that it must take the middle way: stay in the administration but at the same time become the expression of popular discontent.

The latter is real because the administration has not implemented any policy aimed at massive redistribution or abrupt social change, with the worker being totally indifferent to the idea of nationalization. But can this social discontent, which can be found among the various categories of the population, sustain a political opposition?

Public opinion first of all is convinced today that the economic situation is difficult; but the public is too well educated and realizes that nominal wage hikes can bring about very negative consequences for wage-earners and it is thus ready to place its trust in the cautious but effective policy of Delors. Next, and above all, the pressure in support of social measures can more easily be exerted upon the PS or, on the other hand, against the entire left than from within the left in favor of the PCF because the PCF's political image has seriously deteriorated.

In almost everybody's judgment, a revival of the PCF would lead to the downfall of the left, since a party of the middle classes would not agree to a left-wing

administration except under absolute socialist control; on the other hand, and beyond the election situation as such, the PCF is increasingly moving away from French political culture.

For a long time now the PCF has not exerted any intellectual influence; for a long time now French public opinion has judged negatively the countries of real socialism; and the operation of the PCF a long time ago began to appear to be profoundly alien to our democratic mores. The split is too wide for the PCF regularly to take initiatives which shock public opinion on the left; 2 years ago, it was Marchais, picking Radio-Moscow to approve the invasion of Afghanistan; last year it was the racist initiatives taken in the Paris subways; this year it was the friendly correspondence between Marchais and Jaruzelski at a moment when the Solidarity Union was being crushed by the police.

It is true that the current weakening of the PCF can be explained above all by Francois Mitterrand's strategic victory; but in the long run, the essential thing is that there is no longer any reason for the Communist Party to remain a major political force in France. What should surprise us is that it survived as long as it did--something which can be explained only by the absence of a political solution on the left over many years. The moment that solution materialized--unexpected as it was--the Communist Party could not stop its decline.

France is not going through any serious institutional crisis; it is rapidly approaching the social situation of the social democratic countries; it therefore needs no party of the revolutionary type, a party which has moreover been preparing for revolutions since the start of this century which is increasingly alien to the new sensitivity and demands, as it demonstrated so spectacularly in May 1968.

The PCF leaders can only choose between the rope and the poison. Either they link up with the PS which supports its ally like a rope supports the person dangling from it or they prefer a more independent death and throw themselves into the opposition which will poison them and rob them of strength because few of these would tomorrow agree to defend a communist political solution. Could Marchais do better than successively defending contradictory policies such as sincere love of, rupture with, and marriage of convenience with the Socialist Party? I do not think so. He deserves to remain the secretary general of a party which cannot extricate itself from its contradictions, a party in whose case it is difficult to see by what miracle it could recover its reason for existence.

Those who do not share Marchais' ideas can suggest only one solution: Rejoining the PS in fact, with the hope of imbuing it with a little bit of that militant spirit and that loyalty to the workers' struggle which that middle-class party is, in effect, lacking. The topic of union in the common struggle, the Euro-communist ideas can only make it enter the PS or its management apparatus because it is that party which today speaks in the name of the entire left--and not the PCF. We can understand that individuals would make such a choice; we can understand even better that the PCF rejects that choice because it would be tantamount to scuttling itself.

Must we conclude that the PCF has no future? It seems as a matter of fact impossible for it to regain its leading role on the left but, while losing ground, it can still prepare a strategy capable of slowing down and limiting that withdrawal. The socialists' current strategy as a matter of fact is not the only possible strategy. In a few years, perhaps, it will need to recapture the voice of the center.

After having achieved great structural changes which it supports for ideological reasons and after having exhausted the resources of a social democratic policy, it will probably have to be more attentive to the more modern public opinion currents and it will have to concern itself primarily with the efficiency of the operation of enterprises and government agencies.

At that moment, the archaism and the rigidity of the Communist Party will be embarrassing and will make the latter again switch to the opposition or it will be pushed into the opposition; but that will happen along with the preservation of a close alliance with major currents in the PS because the latter will take a very long time and will have much difficulty in making a choice between two strategies and identical policies. The strategic reasons which brought the PCF to power, when it was in full decline, will not disappear so soon and the PCF has reason to establish links which will be durable. Perhaps, its allies of tomorrow in the PS will not be exactly the same as those of yesterday but its allies will be numerous and will be convinced for a long time to come.

The fall of the PCF is thus taking place in three stages: First of all, it ceased to be the principal party of the left although it continued to have its political freedom; during the second stage, it became the junior partner of the left-wing tendency which really holds power; during the next stage, it will only be the junior partner of the tendency that has become the minority on the left and it will be reduced to holding only the secondary decisionmaking centers. It is then only--when the search for a real synthesis among the various tendencies of the PS will persuade all of them to get rid of an ally who has become somewhat troublesome--it is then only that the PCF, reduced to its own strength, will definitely become a political force of secondary importance.

These prospects justify a political strategy which by necessity is that of the communist ministers since it makes it possible to delay the decline and to give history enough time to bring about a miracle or a catastrophe that would give the PCF its reason for existence. But it is impossible for a congress to discuss the situation in these terms and the distance between strategies, all of which consists in managing the retreat, and a public discourse, which can only be optimistic, explains the impression of unreality which that congress would create.

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CSO: 3100/451

GOVERNMENT INCONSISTENCIES ON FOREIGN ISSUES RAPPED

Funds for NATO

Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 23 Mar 82 p 2

/Text/ Editorial: "Not a Defaced Dime" /

/Text/ Referring to the expenditures of the new budget, Prime Minister Papandreu said, "You can be sure that not one defaced dime will go there (NATO)." This assertion was categorical: Of the overall --and rather increased-- amount of 200 plus billion drachmas to be appropriated this year for military needs, not even a dime is anticipated for NATO purposes. We would hail such a course with every bit of sincerity. Unfortunately, however, the budget data do not justify it. In fact, just the opposite. Because there are explicit provisions for expenditures on NATO projects not only in Greece but in other countries that are members of the alliance. Beyond that, it is known that, in essence, the amount, the nature and composition of military expenditures are prescribed, in one way or another, by the more general expediencies of the North Atlantic Treaty. Nevertheless, the prime minister's statement, which was made in answer to a specific question by farmers, leaves room for an unquestionable truth to be revealed. Namely, that expenditures for NATO's account do not serve the national interest, that they clash with the issue of our national independence and a real national defense policy. With his categorical assertions, Mr Papandreu indirectly recognized this truth.

Portugal's EEC Membership

Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 21 Mar 82 p 16

/Text/ Editorial: "Solid Assistance" /

/Text/ The statement made following the talks of the prime minister with Portuguese Prime Minister Balsemao for the "solid support" of our country for Portugal's entry into the EEC has caused a sensation and justified questions among the democratic powers. Because this statement comes in sharp opposition with the well-known PASOK proclamation "against the monopolies in the EEC" and against our country's entry into it because "our national interests are harmed." It is not possible for you to recognize the fatal consequences on

your country by having it enter the EEC and at the same time for you to support the entry of another country, in this particular case, that of Portugal. Unless there is a ceding and change from previous assurances. And it is rather the latter that is happening, as also shown by all that the PASOK government has repeatedly declared about a special status in the EEC. For that reason, it is assuming with such eagerness to support Portugal's entry into the European Community. However, this action comes into striking opposition and desire of the working people of Portugal and the desire of the farmers and people of our country who are feeling all the more the consequences of the country's entry and who demand all the more persistently and imperatively the disengagement of our country. The government of Mr Papandreu has an obligation to take this into consideration and to reconsider its decision.

AWACS Base Controversy

Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 21 Mar 82 p 16

/Editorial: "Unfounded Claims"

/Text/ In his answer to a question by KKE deputies, Deputy Minister of National Defense Drosogiannis confirmed the charges that the base in Aktion is designed for the basing of the flying spy radar AWACS. Mr Drosogiannis tried to justify the concession of this base to NATO with the claim that the AWACS allegedly do not have any espionage characteristics. However, it is well-known that the AWACS, even in accordance with official NATO statements given out publicly (and about which RIZOSPASTIS has written much recently), are designed for surveillance of the territory of socialist countries, as well as of those regions where "sources of tension" are being manifested. Also, according to NATO sources in Brussels, the AWACS will be directly linked with the American "rapid development" force. All of this shows that there is no doubt over the espionage role of the AWACS. Moreover, NATO sources have declared many times in the recent past that the base in Aktion will be used for spying on socialist countries (of the Balkans and the European region of the USSR), while a similar base will operate in Crete for the basing of AWACS that will spy on the Middle East region. Besides the possibility of our country's involvement in the adventurous plans of NATO and the United States, the acceptance of the AWACS stationing in our country is also an open enemy action to the detriment of the socialist and Arab countries, at the very time when Greece has full need of their friendship and assistance. At the same time, however, the AWACS will be used by the United States and NATO --and there can be no doubt whatsoever on this point-- against the very national security of our country.

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CSO: 4621/265

ALLEGED GOAL OF KKE POLICY IN PASOK DENIED

Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 24 Mar 82 p 3

/Article by Th. Tsiokos: "KKE Policy and the Right" /

/Excerpt/ Both the Right and its publications cry out in unison that the KKE is allegedly accusing the PASOK government as much as the honorable Right opposition. Nothing is further than the truth than that. And only the fact that such things are talked and written about by circles whose persistent goal is to profit from any political situation whatsoever, including the Nazi occupation, shows their quality and purpose. A comparison of KKE policy with that of the rightist opposition can be made not to ascertain any similarity or identity, but to categorically exclude any such thing. The KKE has never nor does it now engage in trade in ideas or in selling off one's country. Even more, it does not need to seek recourse to any kind of demagogic. Its policy is spotless. Because it has nothing to fear.

It serves the people's interests and aspirations. Permanently. In all situations, difficult ones and easy ones. Because of this reason, the KKE and the communists have been and are the permanent target of the Right which, for evident reasons, very belatedly does not hesitate to appear as pro-labor and pro-people. And it is doing so with much audacity and cynicism, as when it held complete authority in the past. What comparison, therefore, can be made between the KKE's policy and that of the Right? The latter is seeking to bring the PASOK government and the KKE, as well as all democratic forces, into conflict, using even the pre-election slogans of PASOK, so that it could claim that its own policy has not gone bankrupt, that it is the only one qualified and that it is even being imitated by the present government.

The Right would have wanted the oppressors of the Greek people (NATO and the Americans) to guarantee our eastern frontiers. If possible, they would have guided and would continue guiding all enemy actions against our country to become guarantors. It is applying pressure to prevent any change in Greece's commitments and alliances (NATO, EEC, we belong to the West). The Right is pursuing bi-partisanship in accordance with the Anglo-American model. Already, its representatives are recommending that the same predatory electoral system remain so that neither of the two big parties would have need of the assistance by the KKE or its determining role so that the simple proportional system might not be enacted.

If the government should be brought down, as the Right is trying and desiring, that will not happen because the KKE is pursuing constructive and productive criticism. It will happen as a result of the government's abandonment of its own proclamations, of its own policy. The KKE has never and does not now aim at any such thing. And for that reason, it differs radically from the Right. The Right aims at having the anti-popular status it inherited remain intact; at having no democratic change and disengagement in its foreign orientation; at maintaining and increasing the privileges of the oligarchy, of the wealthy and the monopolies; at increasing the exploitation of the people by all means whatsoever; at cutting back to greater levels of poverty the meager income of the workers to the benefit of both local and foreign big capital. That is what the Right is seeking. In general terms, PASOK's proclamations on the major issues of the country and of the people are similar to the KKE's. The vast majority of the people, who condemned the policy of the Right, has voted for just these proclamations and promises. If they should be changed, modified or postponed for any indefinite period of time, it is not the KKE's fault. Neither does the KKE seek to make it falsely appear that the government does not support the interests of the people and does not implement its pre-election promises. That kind of politicking is a feature of the Right's demagogery.

The Right is seeking and is anticipating a "clash" between the KKE and the government. But if any kind of rift, any kind of counter-alignment could take place here, then it can be none other than a counter-alignment of the overwhelming majority of the people in the recent minority vote of the oligarchy and its political representatives. So that this counter-alignment might prove useful for the people in a definitive and invariable manner, a consistent exercise and implementation of a radical, pragmatic, anti-imperialist and antimonopolistic change is needed with the broadest participation of the popular masses.

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KKE (INT) POLICY, ATTITUDE CHANGES ANALYZED

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 21 Mar 82 p 18

/Text/ The KKE (Int) wants to change into a party of the Left without any rigid communist characteristics. Evident goals of this change is to increase its appeal to the leftist masses that are not true blue communist and to make a clear-cut split with the KKE.

This "transformation" derives from a series of basic changes that the party central committee is proposing to be voted on during its next congress which convenes on 15 May.

Primary changes being proposed for the "transformation" are the following:

- A clear-cut separation of the KKE (Int.) vision from the confinement of "substantive socialism" existing in the countries of East Europe.

The KKE (Int.) is seeking to establish a radically new social order of socialism with "freedom, democracy and self-determination."

This means that the principle for promoting revolutionary change through violent means is being abandoned.

At the same time, the "position" for a broader rallying together resembles PASOK's position which wants progress toward change by stages and to the extent of its popular acceptance.

- The composite term "Marxism-Leninism" is dropped but the term "Marxism" remains. Thus, only the KKE is a Marxist-Leninist party in Greece.

- One other change relates to equal cooperation which is now extended to socialist and leftist parties that are also pursuing socialism with freedom and democracy.

Thus, a distinction is made with the dogmatic, monolithic parties which have a concept of freedom and democracy different from that practiced in western regimes.

The broadening of guidelines for equal cooperation is justified on the basis of an appraisal that social forces have increased significantly in the modern era, forces that reject capitalism and that fight for socialist transformation.

- The term "democratic centralism" is eliminated and is replaced by the principle of intra-party democracy and unity in action.

Now with the change being suggested, the KKE (Int.) will seek to ensure a more direct participation of party members in the working out of the party line and in reaching party decisions.

Stalinist

The basic changes are justified by the following assessments: The old terms (Marxism-Leninism, proletarian internationalism, democratic centralism) are arbitrary Stalinist theoretical fabrications or historically outstripped or else distorted, for the purpose of subjugating the world trade union movement to the policy of the Soviet Union and to the model of "substantive socialism" of the countries of East Europe.

Undoubtedly, the KKE (Int.) is undertaking a new effort to emphasize its different nature from the KKE.

More evident is its attempt to be seen as a democratic party of the Left and to be identified with the Eurocommunist parties, as the Italian and Spanish ones.

As has been determined, goals of the KKE (Int.)'s new approach is: The winning over of communists including those non-party members who otherwise would strengthen the rival KKE, as well as those leftists who would have become disillusioned with PASOK.

In view of the upcoming KKE (Int.) congress, certain thoughts are being expressed over a change in party leadership.

Mr Drakopoulos has already put forward this issue with the understanding that the congress has a sovereign right to renew its confidence in the present leadership team or to change it.

In case of a change in the KKE (Int.) leadership, party circles mention the candidacies of Messrs Banias, Filinis and Kyros.

Beyond that, the "renovations" the KKE (Int.) wants to make in the make-up, the unfinished battles with the other KKE and the strong criticism made by EDA against the two communist parties --criticized for being prisoners of their old mentality-- are an additional expression of the ferment in the Left, with the following main characteristics: confrontation among the two communist parties, EDA, PASOK and the attempt to obtain benefits for the downgrading of the impression of the governing party in this area.

RESULTS OF UNIVERSITY STUDENT ELECTIONS SHOW KKE (INT) RISE

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 19 Mar 82 pp 1,3

[Text] Beyond the increased participations of university students in this year's student elections, the main characteristic of these was the spectacular rise of the student faction affiliated with the KKE(Interior) the ("Democratic Struggle") which was able to increase its strength by about 50 percent.

Of special significance also was the fact that the faction affiliated with the KKE (PSK [Pan-Student Trade Union Movement]) lost a percentage point even though its votes increased somewhat in absolute numbers. The PSK is still in first place, which the faction affiliated with the PASOK (PASP [Panhellenic Militant Student Faction]) was unable to wrest away from it, despite the fact that the difference between the two dropped from 6.5 to about 4.5 percentage points. The PASP increased its strength by one point.

The DAP-NDFK (New Democracy) [Democratic Renewal Vanguard - New Democracy Student Movement] also showed an increase in strength in votes and percentage points (one point), but was surpassed by the "Democratic Struggle" [KKE-Interior] and placed fourth.

The anarchist-autonomous-independent-leftists "groupings" suffered another decline this year, which reached 40 percent of their overall strength last year.

More specifically, the final results of the university student elections are as follows (by approximation of minimal tens of units because the EFEU [National Student Union of Greece] was not able to publish them in the end due to dissension). Last year's results are shown in parentheses:

Voted:		(48,000)	Percentage Points	
PSK (KKE)	16,550	(15,500)	31.5	(32.2)
PASP (PASOK)	14,100	(12,400)	26.8	(25.8)
DA-DE KKE(I)	7,600	(4,950)	14.4	(10.3)
DAP (ND)	6,850	(5,800)	13.0	(12.0)

Groupings	3,300	(5,350)	6.2	(10.1)
Various	2,000	(1,000)	3.8	(1.0)
Blanks	2,100	(4,000)	4.0	(6.2)
Void				

(In the numbers of the "Groupings" are included those of the PPSP (KKE - Marxist - Leninist [Progressive Pan-Student Faction]) of last year, when it appeared by itself as well as this year's).

The Parties

"The decision of the university students to struggle on the side of the socialist government for the promotion of legislative changes in the AEI [Highest Education Institutions] shows a victory of the progressive forces," the Press Office of the PASOK emphasized in a release yesterday.

On the other hand, in a release of the KNE [Greek Communist Youth], emphasis is that, "the university students by their vote approved the slogans and the aims of true change and have reaffirmed their decision to struggle in order to realize the goal of deep changes in the AEI."

In commenting on yesterday's results of the university students elections, the KKE (Interior) in an announcement states that "new tendencies are taking shape in the university students' electorate, with the rise of these forces who struggled for the bill without surcease. The results of the election show that new possibilities are created for a policy of energetic intervention and not for passive protest or sterile opposition.

In Ioannina a group of "anarchists," after the result of the elections was made known, set fire to the entrance of the University which, upon spreading, threatened the building, according to an announcement by the president.

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RIGHT, LEFT COMMENT ON AMBIGUOUS PASOK EEC POLICY

Contradictions Pointed Out

Athens I AVGI in Greek 20 Mar 82 p 5

[Text] We fully understand the rationale behind Mr. Papandreu's assurance that he will support the request of Portugal to join the European Community. In essence, the premier said, "We are ready to support the request of Mr. Balsemão. We consider Portugal as a South European country which will contribute to the common struggle, within the Community, in facing the known problem of North-South because the problems the country faces in the Community are of that very nature and the presence of other voices who will promote the interests of the people of Southern Europe..." It is evident that this rationale leads directly to the heart of the EEC, in fighting shape of course, to protect the interests of our people and, more generally, the common interests of the peoples of Southern Europe and to the promotion of "radical changes." Naturally, this is a statement which, in essence is already being applied in practice with the energetic participation of the PASOK (as the government party now) in all EEC agencies.

For this reason, while we can fully understand all of the above, what we cannot understand (is it beyond our comprehension?) is why Mr. Papandreu occasionally curses EEC, and some pending referendum, etc. This does not agree with the above because it is outside the EEC's jurisdiction and creates an unjust confusion in the true position of the government as regards the EEC. Luckily, this happens only in the propaganda field and it would be to the advantage of the government and to the effects of its policy if it freed it from these contradictions even if only in its rhetoric.

PASOK's Own Trap

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 24 Mar 82 p 2

[Text] The relations of our country with the EEC are a big headache for PASOK. It would not suffer today if it had shown some foresight before the elections. It did not. Because joining the EEC was the doing of the New Democracy, it attacked it with fury. It did not find any advantages in it for Greece. It presented it as a disaster and taught its followers to view it in the same light. As a government, though, it became aware that it could not comply with the slogan "out of the EEC." The advantages our country derives from joining are significant. It is not possible

for us to withdraw from the Community without subjecting our economy to a severe shock, especially at a time when it is undergoing a severe crisis and is in need of all the foreign help it can get, but PASOK was trapped by its own demagoguery. It had to show some results, however slight, of its pre-electoral positions in order to save face. It should, somehow, soften the arguments of the KKE which is pressuring it to keep its pre-electoral promises on the EEC and NATO because Moscow does not want us to belong to either. The results of these difficulties is the contradictory and fickle policy of the PASOK towards the EEC. The result of the same difficulties is the famous "conditions" PASOK placed before the EEC and announced day before yesterday with great fanfare. It is an act more for show than one of substance. It is a new show of pointless bravado in view of the fact that our relations with the EEC have their own dynamics and develop under the pressure of common problems without histrionics. There is no room for ultimatums in this situation. What will the government do if the Community cannot do any more for us than it now does? What will it do if it asks for one hundred and the Community gives fifty? This would have been the ultimate absurdity. It will surely reach that point. It simply will continue to shoot off fireworks, like those of day before yesterday to blind us in order to prevent us from seeing its perplexity.

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MYSTERY SHROUDS DISCOVERY OF KAPETOS PHONE TAPS

Details of the Discovery Given

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 23 Mar 82 pp 1,7

[Excerpts] AKROPOLIS is revealing today the unprecedented incident of the interception of the telephone conversations of the chief of the Naval General Staff, Vice Admiral Kapetos. Mr. Kapetos resigned his position as Chief of the GEN [Naval General Staff] after a heated argument with the deputy minister of National Defense, Mr. Drosogiannis, as a result of his objection to party meddling.

What AKROPOLIS is publishing today on the subject of the interceptions of the telephone conversations of Mr. Kapetos is the continuation of what the newspaper had discovered regarding the monitoring of telephones from a special room at the OTE [Greek Telecommunications Organization].

The government had, at the time, attempted to deny the telephone monitoring report with a statement by deputy minister of Communications, Mr. Valyrakis.

However, the new case, much more serious because it involves the chief of the GEN, belies the government's assertions. It casts a shadow of doubt, that some partisan machinery close to the government is tapping telephones regardless of the fact that the government will again pretend to be ignorant of what is happening.

The interception of the telephone conversations of Vice Admiral Kapetos was verified by experts after the intervention of the district attorney.

The Discovery

The details of the evil plot--which undoubtedly will have political repercussions and possible criminal consequences--according to the investigation conducted by AKROPOLIS, are as follows:

The interception of the telephone conversations of Mr. Kapetos was discovered on 16 February--that is, 40 days after he assumed his duties as chief of GEN. Ever since, the strictest secrecy was maintained by the counter espionage services and the Security authorities.

It appears that Mr. Kapetos' telephone was tapped after 4 January, that is, shortly after his appointment as chief of the GEN.

According to our sources, when Mr. Kapetos became chief of the GEN, he requested the installation of a secure telephone line in his home, at 9 Skoufou Street--near Syndagma--so as to be able to speak whenever it was necessary, without danger of someone "listening in." However, those who wished to monitor the telephone conversations on the secure line had a different idea. They connected the secure line to another telephone which had been installed on the 1st floor apartment of the building across the street at 10 Skoufou Street.

That three-room apartment belongs to Mrs. Rallou Dimoulitsas who resides in Kolonaki. The last tenant was former deputy of the New Democracy from Kozani, Mr. Papadopoulos, who after losing the election, moved to Kozani and gave up the apartment.

Suspicions

The secure telephone in the residence of Mr. Kapetos had been installed by special employees of the National Defense Ministry, with an added security device in order to allow the chief of the GEN to speak freely and even to issue secret orders without any danger of "leaks."

The installation of the secure line was made on 6 or 7 January. However, just a few days later, strange noises and interference began to be heard over Mr. Kapetos' secure telephone.

This "disturbance" continued until 15 February. Then, Mr. Kapetos' wife requested the assistance of the district attorney and the police to determine what exactly was happening.

The following day, policemen, military personnel and OTE employees went to the residence of Mr. Kapetos and began an exhaustive search resulting in the full discovery of the telephone tap which has all the characteristics of an evil plot because it was ascertained that the secure line was connected to a telephone in the apartment at 10 Skoufou Street.

The military and OTE specialists who located the tap admitted to the district attorney and the police that the manner in which it was done was unique and the method used by the unknown perpetrators had not been encountered before.

Secrecy

Investigations began immediately by the 2nd Security Detachment and the 2nd Staff Bureau of the Naval General Staff, in order to discover the perpetrators of this unprecedented act. All investigations were conducted with the utmost secrecy and strict measures were taken to prevent any leaks on the subject.

In the meantime the investigations have led nowhere. Naturally, the perpetrators remain unknown as well as their motives.

'Amateur' Job Suspected

Athens TA NEA in Greek 24 Mar 82 p 1

[Text] The tapping of Admiral Od. Kapetos'--until dat before yesterday, Chief of the GEN [Naval General Staff]--telephone is shrouded in mystery. The home telephone

of the admiral, on 9 Skoufou Street, in Syndagma had been tapped with a "duplex" system, installed in another apartment across the street from the apartment building where the admiral resides. The other apartment, where the interception "duplex" was found, had been rented by the former deputy from Kozani, Mr. G. Papadopoulos.

For this reason, according to the latest information, the office of the district attorney which has undertaken the investigation of the incident, will have to proceed "by the process of elimination." To the great question of "Who could have perpetrated the interception?" there are some initial explanations:

The minister of Public Order, Mr. G. Skoularikis, and the deputy director of OTE [Greek Telecommunications Organization], Mr. Theof. Tombras, in statements made yesterday, denied that the interception could have been carried out by a Greek security service or the OTE.

The possibility that the interception, in the opinion of some, was the work of a foreign special service does not appear to carry weight. This theory is supported by the fact that the interception was done by means of a wire-- a method considered to be "clumsy" and "artless" for "specialists" of wiretaps. Methods of similar handiwork are used as a rule by private detectives or amateur eavesdroppers.

This fact leads some to exclude the possibility that someone in Admiral Kapetos' family may be involved in the wiretap, unbeknownst to the admiral, of course. The mystery of the matter is further complicated by the fact that the terminal box of the apartment building had a parallel line [the interception line] which ended in a telephone set located in an empty apartment. The mystery increases perhaps because that apartment is rented by the former ND deputy from Kozani, Mr. Georgios Papadopoulos, who, after his unsuccessful campaign in the recent elections, resides permanently in Salonica where he has his business.

Could the wiretap have been made from Mr. Papadopoulos' apartment for partisan motives?

The district attorney, the OTE technicians and the officers of the Security Services who a month ago discovered the wiretaps, also found that there were no traces of individual or individuals having lived in the neighboring and empty apartment.

Based on this fact one can reach two conclusions: either the surveillance was conducted from the neighboring apartment at an earlier time or "from some distance" and simply the tapping of the telephone of the chief of the GEN became safer from the apartment of Mr. Papadopoulos.

Mr. Papadopoulos, in a statement to VIMA, revealed that after the 1981 elections, he had requested the OTE to disconnect the two telephones which as a deputy he had in the apartment on Skoufou Street. This was done at the end of November, but, three months later on of these "dead" telephones was found to be connected to Admiral Kapetos' telephone. "I do not know, perhaps someone had also tapped my telephone," Mr. Papadopoulos said, who recently had decided to terminate the lease and had given the keys to the doorman of the building to let in prospective renters. In the end, all suspicions and probabilities are related to a critical time element, with the question: "When did the wiretapping begin?"

As stated yesterday by OTE deputy director, Mr. Tombras, the installation of the telephone connection at the residence of Admiral Kapetos was made on 4 February 1982 by the OTE workshop, in accordance with the rules of the service. "At the time of the installation," Mr. Tombras emphasized, "it was ascertained through the appropriate technical inspection that the telephone line showed no irregularities."

This could mean that the wiretapping (through Mr. Papadopoulos' apartment) was installed after 4 February.

These and other questions are being investigated by the district attorney's office, while, to be sure, the question remains unanswered as to why Mr. Kapetos decided to make known the tapping of his telephone one month after it was discovered by the OTE and one day after his resignation as chief of the GEN.

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PCI'S BUFALINI CITED ON SPAIN'S NATO ENTRY

PM131331 Venice L'UNITA in Italian 2 Apr 82 p 15

[Unattributed report on PCI directorate member Paolo Bufalini 1 April speech in Italian senate: "Dangerous Decision for All (Including Italy)"]

[Excerpt] Comrade Paolo Bufalini began by stressing that three kinds of argument are put forward by the majority to support Spain's joining NATO! The defense and consolidation of the young--and what is usually called the fragile--Spanish democracy; the fact that Spain has already been linked since 1953 to a bilateral agreement on military cooperation and for the granting of bases to the United States; the more general problems of the balance of forces and detente. Well, Bufalini said, we are opposed to the ratification proposed by the government and precisely on the basis of these three kinds of argument.

First, the question of the consolidation of democracy in Spain, which is "the essence of the history and soul of our country's communists, socialists and democrats and the precondition of Italy's resistance, no less." According to Bufalini, the argument that Spain's entry into NATO would provide a protective shield for its democratic system against attacks, threats and possible further reactionary assaults seems unfounded. Historical experience--particularly in Greece and Turkey--shows the opposite; it shows that when a country belongs to a bloc, in this case NATO, and occupies a key position within it (such as the Turkish "bastion" in the southeastern corner or the Spanish one on the southwestern corner) a rightwing authoritarian regime, perhaps established by means of a coup d'etat, is tolerated there or even favored by some, being considered likely to make the bloc alignment more secure at that point. This, Bufalini warned, applies particularly, albeit with other characteristics, to the opposite bloc, as shown, in various forms, by Afghanistan, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Serious Split

Senator Sarti, Bufalini pointed out, says that we refer to only part of the Spanish political forces (the communists, socialists and leftwing forces and urges us to consider the rest, too. Of course in Spain the leftwing forces jointly reject NATO membership and jointly demand EEC membership; but our arguments are not merely "partisan." In fact we observe that NATO membership has constituted and already constitutes the most serious factor splitting the cohesive fabric of differing forces that has hitherto constituted the main defense of Spain's young democracy. Far from favoring a consolidation of democracy,

the decision to join NATO--taken by a small and precarious majority which refused the popular referendum demanded by the leftwing forces--has already acted and is now acting as a factor weakening the very foundations of Spanish democracy. Especially since it followed a crisis that led to the exit from the government of Suarez himself and that was followed by the attempted coup. How can one fail to be worried by all this? In any case, does that narrow and precarious majority still exist, since the crisis in the union of the democratic center led to a split which, it seems to me, produced a different party?

With regard to the second class of arguments, Bufalini asked how it is possible to deny that Spain's entry into NATO seriously alters the existing balance of forces in Europe, that it in fact alters the very characteristics and role of NATO. All the arguments used to prove the contrary EDN to minimize the event so as to make it acceptable to the leftwing of the majority and ultimately conceal its real significance and gravity.

The undeniable fact, Bufalini stressed, is that NATO is spreading and growing with the help of a country rich in resources and situated in a vital area and that it thus carries significant new weight in the Mediterranean, with the role of enabling NATO and the United States to conflict the Arab world, North Africa and even the Gulf area--a role that is not only defenseive but is aimed at asserting vital U.S. interests in all these areas. These are the real facts, pure and simple.

Spain's membership of NATO therefore constitutes a further grave confirmation of a strategy and a political outlook still based on military blocs and their counterposition, just when a greater and more committed attempt must be made to surmount them. Furthermore, this event tends to project the Atlantic bloc into the Mediterranean and to form a European and Mediterranean bloc bound to and integrated with U.S. policy, which would oppose the Arab world. It therefore tends to shift Spain from its traditional policy of friendship toward the Arab world into stances closer to those of the United States. It is within this framework that the government has taken its untimely, hasty (and we would also say constitutionally very questionable) decision to send Italian minesweepers to Sinai, right at a time when the Begin government's expansionist policy in the occupied Arab territories is being implemented most aggressively, harshly and stubbornly. It is within this situation, Bufalini repeated, that the Atlantic Alliance's extension to the Mediterranean and its expansion to new and important countries is taking place.

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BERLINGUER INTERVIEWED ON 'EURO-LEFT'

PM131539 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 1 Apr 82 pp 1, 13

[Barbara Spinelli 31 March interview in Paris with PCI secretariat member Enrico Berlinguer: "Interview on Europe"]

[Text] Paris, 31 March--"The entire left in Europe has a historical lag to make up for: it still has to invent a shared language for tackling today's economic and social crises. It must establish the forums in which a joint strategy can be formulated. But here in Paris, I have had to impression that some steps forward are possible. And if there is one point on which the Italian communists' analyses entirely coincide with those of the French socialists it is precisely the awareness--present in both parties--the traditional models can no longer be used. Not the Soviet model, which we reject, but not the social democratic one either, which has produced noteworthy results, to say the least, but which nevertheless is now short of breath."

Enrico Berlinguer had just completed an hour's conversation with Francois Mitterrand at the Elysee Palace: he granted us this interview after the meeting. It is a stocktaking of a visit likely to impart a new thrust to the Euro-left and to give a shot in the arm to the now haggard band of "Eurocommunists."

[Question] Convergences seem more difficult to achieve with regard to the future of detente. Opinions diverge on the fundamental issue of East-West military balances.

[Answer] Indeed, our assessment of the balance of forces on the old continent differs from that of the French socialists. We do not rule out the possibility that the Soviet SS-20s have created an imbalance in the European Theater. But we would like the count to comprise all the weapons held by both blocs--those deployed on European territory and in the so-called "NATO forward bases," the conventional weapons and also the two major powers' strategic weapons. Be that as it may, it is true that there is not a total similarity of viewpoints between the PCI and the PS on the major topics of detente. In this regard in fact our party feels closer to the German Social Democrats and to the policy pursued by the Bonn Government, but that does not mean that our sharing of interests is short-lived. In the field of building socialism in Western Europe, which we consider decisive, the convergences are very substantial.

[Question] But the French socialists have decided to break away from the social democratic model by resorting, at least initially, to the old formula of nationalizations. Are you in agreement on this too?

[Answer] I do not believe that is their only formula. In any case our options are clearly different, because the individual countries' existing situations are not the same. In France the nationalizations were needed to smash the rule of big capital over a predominant section of industry and finance. In our country the problems are different: in Italy the state already controls a very large proportion of the economy and the task is therefore to make the management of the public sector more efficient and more correct, freeing it from the Cronyist mentality.

Leftwing Forces' Tardiness

[Question] Mr Berlinguer, you have come to France in search of a new internationalism, while the leftwing forces are languishing in Europe. In the Netherlands, Germany and even France, the socialist parties are in difficulties.

[Answer] Wait a minute: Before talking about the decline of the leftwing forces you must look at the real situation. Just over a year ago, in the wake of Margaret Thatcher's and Ronald Reagan's victory, it seemed that the right-wing forces had triumphed in the West. Then came 10 May in France, however, and the balance shifted again. Of course there has been a decline on the part of the leftwing forces in a number of regional elections, both in Germany and in France. But it is a very slight decline. It indicates that the right is not standing still, that it is trying to recover its lost ground. I would not yet talk in terms of an inexorable reverse trend. Having said that, I do agree with you: even the left is encountering difficulties within its own blueprint. This is exactly what I meant when I referred to a delay which all progressive forces must make up for.

[Question] What kind of delay?

[Answer] In my opinion there is a challenge which the workers' movement must meet as an absolute priority: in the present crisis its strategy must not be restricted to a defense of the organized and trade unionized working class. It must also espouse and embody within its blueprint the aspirations and demands of the broad masses of underprivileged people, the unprotected and the unemployed. And when I say that the social democratic model is now obsolete, I am not arguing in ideological terms, but making a very realistic analysis: the objective conditions that permitted social democracy's invaluable gains no longer exist. The advent and emancipation of the third world have completely eliminated the scope for maneuver hitherto used by social democratic administration. Their gains were possible in a particular period of history, when the developed countries could calmly exploit the resources of less developed countries.

North-South Dialogue

[Question] In other words, the left must succeed in confronting the crisis of the welfare state. It must demand more austerity if it wants to fight for a more united society....

[Answer] Precisely. But when I mentioned austerity in Italy, what a tide of criticisms I brought on myself! And yet this is so obviously the path to be pursued, especially if we want to safeguard the principal gains of the welfare state. Since it is clear that the right does not have the correct formula either, Reagan's formula is to severely cut all forms of social spending. At the very extreme, Chile has decided to safeguard the middle classes and simply to allow the poor sectors, formerly protected by the welfare state, to die. The left is moving in the opposite direction. But it must succeed in responding to the demands both of the "protected" working class and to those of the underprivileged.

[Question] But with what kind of economic development?

[Answer] In my opinion it is necessary to seek a new "main-spring" of recovery, similar to the one found immediately after the war. At that time the main-spring was the development of personal consumption. Now this option cannot be realized and new methods, new impeti must be invented, I am convinced that only a major new thrust to north-south relations can resolve this problem. I am talking about the social south of Europe and the geopolitical south on the world scale.

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POLITICAL

ITALY

BRIEFS

MESSAGE TO BRAZILIAN CP--Rome--On the Brazilian Communist Party's [PCB's] 60th anniversary the PCI Central Committee has sent Brazilian communists the following message: "Dear Comrades, on the PCB's 60th anniversary we extend to you the Italian communists' warmest greetings and good wishes for positive results in your battle to defend the economic and social interests of our country's people's masses and to establish democracy, human rights and freedoms in Brazil. We desire the development of increasingly intensive and fruitful relations between our parties in the interests of the joint struggle for the major ideals of peace, democracy and socialism." [Unattributed report: "PCI Message to Brazilian Communist Party on 60th Anniversary"] [Text] [PM131307 Rome L'UNITA in Italian 27 Mar 82 p 17]

CSO: 3104/165

COMMENTATOR CRITICIZES GROWING ANTI-AMERICANISM

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 16 Mar 82 p 7

[Commentary by P. Hintzen: "Growing Anti-Americanism: Do Not Play Referee in Other Peoples' Competitions"]

[Text] Mr P. Hintzen is the editor of the paper NIEUW WERELD NIEUWS, a publication of the Moral Rearmament.

The Netherlands is eager to express its opinion. There is scarcely any question of global justice where it has not expressly made itself heard. How well founded is that opinion?

Fierce emotions flare up. That is understandable in times when injustice (Poland), genocide (El Salvador and Afghanistan), massive poverty and threats to world peace appear on our televisions. But frequently sobriety is lacking. Is sobriety synonymous in the Netherlands with conservatism (which is suspect in the modern climate), while uproar is perceived as progressivity?

When everything is working well, the public opinion is based on facts. In an emotional atmosphere, fear and indignation threaten to crop up instead of the sober facts.

It is laudable of the NRC HANDELSBLAD that this paper provides space for so many different opinions on questions like peace and armament. But the contradictions in the statements of people who in each case represent themselves to be complete experts makes it difficult to form an opinion. Sometimes it is a relief to read a paper like the NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, which, to be sure, presents the facts in a dry way, but which reflects them strictly objectively.

Most recently in the Netherlands more and more anti-American noises are heard. Now there is nothing wrong with pointing out the faults of President Reagan's America. But the emotional approach, which, for that matter, is represented to be the only ethically proper one, causes many to ignore the situation in which we find ourselves.

That situation is that we have infinitely more in common with the United States than with the Soviet Union; that thanks to American protection Western Europe has

enjoyed 36 years of unknown peace (and welfare); that simply because we have chosen the United States' side, we cannot hop back and forth as free as a bird.

Whatever the faults of the United States may be, as far as our country is concerned the Soviet Union and the United States are definitely not one kettle of fish. Certainly, they are both superpowers, but the United States has an open society. Precisely because of that, we are extremely well aware of the faults of that country and of the far from gentle criticism which the citizens of that country express. The Soviet Union is as tight as a drum by comparison. We only learn very incompletely what outrages are committed over there under the sign of the hammer and sickle, and much less what the people in the Soviet Union and its satellite states think about that. Thus there is a difference as broad as the sky.

Because we stand on the side of the United States, we must be tolerant of what our ally sees as his security requirements. Not without criticism, naturally. In many respects, the security of the United States is our own. We must not judge too hastily that the fear over there is groundless that if one domino falls in Central America, the rest can follow, which could cause the United States to come to be threatened gravely from a neighboring country. Are we really so certain that weapons and men are not flowing from Cuba (which is kept on its feet by stiff injections of rubles) into Central America?

That a lot of blood is being shed there, that human rights are being trodden underfoot--we must raise our voices against that. That all of that is the result of improper regimes there cannot be denied. It is clear that the United States is not blameless in that region (just as the Netherlands is not with respect to Suriname and Indonesia). But however true all of that may be, the recognition of evil does not charm it out of existence.

Pouting Child

If we censure the situation as it is, we must ask ourselves along with the United States: What is the alternative? After all, there is no sense in dumping the oppressed peoples out of the frying pan and into the fire in our righteous indignation. Here lies the ethical dilemma. No matter how gladly we would like to, we cannot play referee in a competition in which we ourselves are playing. We cannot step off of this world and judge from afar. Certainly, ethics is a question of checking reality against moral standards. But we must see the situation in which this reality transpires, and we must follow through to our own responsibility. After all, a small country like ours can very easily assume the role of a spoiled, pouting child. If it does not get its way, it will not play any more.

United States policy in Central America has been directed for years towards allowing the political center, which is presumably in the majority, to have a stronger voice. That was true under Carter, and it is true under Reagan, even though the current administration is inclined to weigh the defense aspects more heavily. The question is to what extent the elections which are scheduled for 23 March will give the political center the chance to which it is entitled. Voting while there is shooting going on is problematical. But the U.S. attempt to that end is to be applauded.

If we proceed no further than denunciatory criticism, we could well fall into the error of spontaneous anarchists, who tear down what exists blindly, in the firm belief that something better will automatically take its place.

Flight into illusion is dangerous. We must proceed from the existing situation in a coldly sober manner. That does not mean, for that matter, that change is evil. On the contrary. It is precisely by renewing itself that the democratic world can again gain creativity. In the confrontation with the communist world (which is a fact, whether we like it or not), this creativity is vitally important, for only if we radiate more than the desire to conserve and private interests will "the idea" of all of our Western doings be apparent to the "outsiders."

6940

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HOEKSTRA ON CHANGES IN COMMUNIST PARTY POLICIES

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 20 Mar 82 Supplement p 3

[Article by Hubert Smeets: "Either you Renew, or you Become a Sect; Henk Hoekstra and the History of the CPN (Communist Party of the Netherlands)]

[Excerpt] After having been chairman of the CPN for 15 years, he is resigning this year: Henk Hoekstra. Only during the past few years has he been able to emerge from the shadow of his predecessor, Paul de Groot. One of the indications of that is the draft constitution of which he is the author.

The considered sentiment of a lukewarm communist as also expressed in the question: "Is a demand for workers' self-government anti-socialist?"

In 1978 and 1979 Hoekstra traveled through all of Eastern Europe for official visits to sister parties. Even at the end of 1978 he acted arrogantly toward the French communists who had eliminated the term "dictatorship of the proletariat" from their vocabulary. "Just like lightning, the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be eliminated," he said in an interview with the HAAGSE POST. Now he says, not without pride, about the draft constitution in which that concept is not included: "We speak against interweaving of party politics and national politics. In that respect, we go further than the PCI [International Communist Party].

"I have no idea how parliamentary democracy will develop in a socialist society. We are not in favor of a rigid economy in which everything is nationalized and uniformized. But at least an end will have been made to the superpower of the multinationals. I admit that that is a very superficial definition of socialism.

"The existence of opposition has a purifying function. If you don't give it legal channels, it becomes illegal. In Eastern Europe that is read with a frown. Well, and? You shouldn't under-estimate your own influence. There are also differences among the countries which call themselves socialist. The Hungarian communists, for example, are very much hampered by the bloc system. That causes narrow distinctions here, but also over there."

Hoekstra says that getting to know socialism in Eastern Europe has caused a decrease of his esteem for the social structure and the role of the communist party there.

At the 27th party congress of the CPN in June 1980 he still spoke about "our common goals." The tone had changed already at that time, however.

Revealing

Almost a year later CPN representative Joop Ijsberg left Prague in a showy manner when, at the congress of the Czechoslovak party, there were open hints at an intervention in Poland. And on Sunday afternoon 13 Dec 1981 the CPN was the first Netherlands political party to condemn the military coup of General Jaruzelski, including the "actual one-party system" in Poland. Wasn't that a little too fast?

Hoekstra: "The Polish events contributed to that to a great extent. Those interviews with Polish Deputy Chairman Rakowski for example, which are very revealing. In fact, he says: in our methods we do not distinguish ourselves from the capitalist regimes. But when a communist wants to remain a communist, he knows that a popular movement can never be suppressed by military violence."

Is a demand for workers' self-government anti-socialist? Surely it is nonsense to say that people who demand that want to reinstate capitalism. That it is thrilling, yes, I believe that. But don't come to me with tales.

"In the past the Soviet Union was an inspiring example because of its struggle against German fascism for example. But you can't cling to that forever. Moreover, it is impossible to applaud in Eastern Europe the renewal movement and simultaneously repress it in their own country. They must also draw the consequences."

According to the CPN chairman that holds true also for his own party. He does not want to downplay the role of communists in the resistance against the German occupier and the opposition of the CPN to police actions by the Netherlands in Indonesia. According to Hoekstra that is a tradition of the CPN which has to be kept alive. "But the veterans in the party don't have more privileges because, for example, their past resistance in the war, do they? Their sacrifices at that time were not made to let them be petrified. Then the communist battles would get bogged down. And that was never the intent."

In the past two years Hoekstra also disassociated himself from Marxism-Leninism. "It does not give an answer to current problems. The concept of Marxism-Leninism, for that matter, was discovered by Stalin, who used it to justify the break with the Third World with it, amongst other things. Lenin however repeatedly pointed to the importance of anti-colonialism. I don't want to part with that Leninism; it is ideologically opposed to Marxism-Leninism, and for us always meant precisely solidarity with Indonesia."

Question! Surely the CPN will have to start giving thought to a different party line? Surely it can't restrict itself merely to renouncing a rigid, dogmatic

view of democratic centralism, as it is called in the draft constitution?

Hoekstra: "In the past, this party model led to rigidity of the CPN with respect to ethical, cultural and moral questions. But I don't exclude the possibility that the CPN will get a party council with a controlling task. I entertained that idea already previously. If this draft is accepted, a great number of questions will have to be discussed. The statutes of the party, for example."

Small Down Payment

Some party associates already made a downpayment on that the past two years. In many places women and homo-groups arose. In the past, even a letter from a number of CPN members in DE VOLSKRANT would already have been seen as splintergroup forming. That no longer bothers Hoekstra, however. "Realistic unity," now is the endeavor. In his eyes the CPN no longer has to act by definition in closed ranks.

That no longer happens, anyway. The past few years the CPN has been especially concerned about the government responsibility which it has always unconditionally aspired to until recently. In 1975 the Amsterdam communists supported PvdA [Labor Party] Councillor Lammers when the latter had the Newmarkt area cleared with the assistance of strong arm methods because the subway had to be built there. The CPN members just recruited at the university also devoted themselves to that end and organized demonstrations against the squatters and their sympathizers in the Newmarkt for fear of losing their hold on the student movement.

Hoekstra: "We solved that unilaterally. From it we drew conclusions. But I won't deny that there is an area of tension between government responsibility and the extra-parliamentary movement. You can't avoid that by forcing a break with one of its three legs: party, government and movement."

This unstable balance was disturbed last year in Zaandam by the CPN councillor who, as acting mayor, signed an evacuation order for a squatters' building in this town. He was rebuked for that through DE WAARHEID by his party chairman.

In Amsterdam and Groningen it emerged in a different manner. In the capital, CPN member Rudi van der Velde was removed from the city council. In Groningen, Lewis Wits last fall had to resign his post as councillor after the communists in the council had split its vote on the location for housing the central direction of the PTT [Post, Telegraph & Telephone Service]. A novelty in the party. "A pity," Hoekstra agrees.

The problem with the administrative posts and the heated discussion now taking place on the question of whether the CPN should still be going after seats in the city councils -- in Amsterdam they were arguing about that for an entire day at the districts conference two weeks ago -- not only illustrate changed international relationships but also the changed view on the organization itself. If it were up to Hoekstra, the communists from now on would no longer impute an avant-garde role to themselves.

Hoekstra: "We have abandoned claims which cannot be materialized. In certain areas we play an avant-garde role, as it may be called, in the CPN.

against nuclear energy the CPN initially didn't play a role, but the PSP [Pacifist Socialist Party] and the PPR [Political Party of Radicals] did. That avant-garde role is suspect because it was always linked to the one-party system. The developments in the socialist countries have indeed justified that suspicion in a certain sense."

Tasteless Poultry

And thus the CPN will, for the first time, go into the provincial states elections together with the PSP and PPR this year, although the CPN found the former 5 years ago to be an "obstacle in the mass struggle" and "tasteless poultry." The CPN is no longer afraid of a "rightist social-democratic infiltration" by the PvdA. List connecting of all the leftist parties is the new form in which the communists want to pour their age-old concept of "coalition politics."

Hoekstra: "The list connections and common lists are no incidents. But re-aligning the Dutch labor class is unthinkable in a one-party system. That differentiation is favorable."

"The NRC [NRC HANDELSBLAD] wrote about the draft constitution: but they remain revolutionary. Yes, you bet; we don't want to deny that at all. We distinguish ourselves from the social democracy through our strategic objective. Without a constitution one is easily seduced into opportunism. Previously, for example, the members could not evaluate the turns of the party leadership."

Somewhat defensively he says: "We really don't want to make ours lives acceptable to the PvdA. From electoral considerations this constitution is not at all interesting; then we would have done better composing something else."

"Some veterans think I went too far. They see me as one of them and they will challenge me on that. But I could not do otherwise. You can't merely consider what the party ought to do. The CPN has to answer questions now which relate to it, for there is justified distrust in them. I wrote this constitution not only as a personal accounting. One could say after the fact: I did not give enough time to it. A number of points I would word differently now. But in a certain sense it is also a compromise."

Hoekstra, aware of the fact that the CPN is judged not only on the draft constitution which is coming up for discussion, but also on its past. "That didn't pass me anyone unnoticed. I tried to recognize it and draw my conclusions from it. In such a process people change, and so do I. I certainly understand the scepticism of others; we sometimes also have reason to be skeptical about the social democrats. But what do you achieve with that?"

Question: Has the CPN become revisionist now?

Hoekstra: "I prefer not to use that word; it is a term of abuse in communist circles. But it is indeed an essential change. The opposition against that within the party has proven that. This constitution will certainly not be adopted unanimously, but I do hope, by a majority. Each change has to be debated."

COLUMNIST COHEN CLARIFIES TURKEY'S MIDDLE EAST POLICY

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 25 Mar 82 p 2

[Article by Sami Cohen: "Turkey's Place..."]

[Text] Turkey's opening to the Middle East is being watched closely in many foreign capitals, especially in light of the top level tours and contacts following each other in rapid succession lately, and is being interpreted in a number of ways.

Certain Western circles obviously entertain some doubts about the significance and goals of this approach. The major question in their minds or right on the tips of their tongues is whether Turkey is about to change its foreign policy and choose the East as an "alternative" to the West.

The expression of views recently in the Middle East in the manner of "Turkey's place is in the East, not the West" may have increased these concerns.

But the fact is certain Western circles have a way of looking at the event that is extremely narrow and superficial.

These friends of ours ought to know that Ankara's revival of relations with the Middle Eastern nations portends no radical change in Turkish foreign policy and aims toward no goals of turning its back on the West.

As we pointed out in our last column, Ankara has to open up to the Middle East and it should be considered natural.

Let us list the important elements of this approach from the standpoint of our national interests as follows:

1. Great export potential: Most of these countries need Turkey's agricultural products and other goods. If Turkey can make the most of this potential it may be able to reduce gradually or close the balance of foreign payments deficits caused by the huge sums spent on oil.

2. Economic cooperation: Turkey may be able to benefit in various ways from these countries' petrodollars. It may be able to obtain credits, engage in joint initiatives and carry out many cooperative development projects.

3. New market for businessmen and workers: The Middle East may become a broader market into which Turkey could channel its technology and workforce.

4. Political approach: If Turkey procured the support of regional nations in various issues, primarily Cyprus and the Aegean problem, it would doubtless be a significant gain.

No one can deny that these factors are sufficient cause for developing the relations with Middle Eastern nations which have been neglected in the past. It is true that the attitude adopted towards Turkey recently by some Western nations and institutions makes this wholly necessary, to wit:

1. Our foreign trade with Western Europe and especially the EEC has fallen off -- primarily because of the economic circumstances in which they find themselves.

2. The EEC and certain Western nations have cut or frozen their aid to Turkey for economic or political reasons.

3. Western European nations no longer want Turkish workers and are even seeking to return the ones there.

4. Some Western nations and institutions have taken a political stance against Turkey. To be frank, a campaign against Turkey is being conducted by certain circles in Europe to cast our national image in shadow.

Doubtless these circumstances have impacted on recent developments in Turkish foreign policy.

Something which certain Western circles may not understand is that Turkey does not wish to open to the Middle East at the cost of alienation from the West. The new relations and cooperation being forged come within the scope of the major goals and principles of a balanced and multidirectional Turkish foreign policy.

However, the West's attitude will doubtless affect the implementation of this policy. Acts adverse to Turkey's interests and intended to pressure the country under various pretexts may make it difficult to preserve the old line of relations with the West in practice.

For this reason, those in the West who would now answer the question of whether Turkey is seeking "new alternatives" or is distancing itself from the West in approaching the East should first ask themselves what purpose, in fact, is served by the stance taken by at least some European nations and institutions.

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LAW REGULATING MEETINGS, DEMONSTRATIONS PROPOSED

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 10 Feb 82 p 8

[Report by Hayri Birler]

[Text] Ankara--The government has drafted a bill on meetings and demonstrations which sets new guidelines for the conditions and manner of meetings and demonstrations and proposes heavier penalties for those who violate bans. The draft bill will be discussed by the Justice Commission of the Consultative Assembly tomorrow.

The preamble to the draft bill notes that Law No 171 on Meetings and Demonstrations has been in force for 10 years, that sometimes it has been misused as a result of loopholes in the law thus upsetting public order, that, consequently, a new legal arrangement was attempted in 1973 only to be revoked by the Constitutional Court and that changes brought in 1976 were also revoked by the Constitutional Court. The preamble continues:

"Such deficiencies and loopholes observed in the implementation of the law and resulting abuses have broadly upset public order and have preoccupied and impaired the administration and the security forces by paralyzing everyday life." The preamble goes on to explain that for this reason it has been decided to regulate the rights and freedoms of organizing meetings and demonstrations by a new law. Noting that penalties against the violators of the law were doubled in 1980, the preamble states that no need has consequently been felt to raise penalties again except in connection with some new regulations and that, however, fines have been raised in order to insure their effectiveness.

What Does the New Draft Bill Bring?

According to the draft bill, everyone has the right to organize and participate in meetings and demonstrations provided one remains within the provisions of the law, is unarmed and does not attack anybody and the meeting or demonstration organized is for purposes which are not considered criminal by laws. In meetings and demonstrations organized by foreigners, Turkish citizens will need the permission of the Ministry of the Interior to address the gathering and to carry placards. According to the draft bill, the location, itinerary and distribution centers of a meeting or demonstration to be held in cities or towns must be made known to the Office of the Governor or the District Headquarters

ahead of time. Open-air meetings and demonstrations will last no later than 1 hour before sunset, while those held in closed spaces must be terminated at 2300 hours. These regulations will also apply to campaign meetings held during elections.

Meetings and demonstrations will be organized by an authorized organizing committee which will consist of at least seven members. The meeting of demonstration will be held only after the Office of the Governor or the District Headquarters which has jurisdiction over the locality where the activity will be held is given a notice signed by all the members of the organizing committee at least 72 hours prior to the time of the activity. This notice will also specify the purpose of the activity. At least seven members of the organizing committee must be present at the meeting or demonstration. This will be verified by a government superintendent by means of an identity check. The organizing committee will be authorized and will be responsible to insure that the activity is held in peace and in an orderly manner and that it does not go beyond its stated purpose. To that end, the organizing committee will take the necessary measures, will be able to ask for assistance from security forces if necessary, and, if peace and order cannot be maintained despite the measures taken, the committee will be able to ask the government superintendent to terminate the activity. The responsibilities of the organizing committee will be in effect until the crowd is completely dispersed from the location of the activity.

At least one and at most three government superintendents will be selected by the Office of the Governor or the District Headquarters from among the officials listed in the draft bill, and these superintendents will be able to record the meeting or demonstration by sound recording devices, movie cameras or similar equipment. According to the draft bill, which authorized government superintendents to terminate activities, governors or ranking district officials will be able to postpone an activity once by not more than 20 days, if that is necessitated by considerations of public order, general ethics and public well-being. In the event more than one meeting or demonstration is planned on the same day in a given province or district, governors or ranking district officials will be able to postpone some of these activities once by not more than 20 days depending on the capacity of security forces under their command. If a governor or ranking district official requests from the Ministry of the Interior reinforcements to enforce security on a day when more than one meeting or demonstration is to be held and if the Ministry cannot meet that request, then the Ministry will be able to postpone some of those activities by not more than 30 days.

Meetings and demonstrations will be held in localities and areas previously announced. However, it will not be possible to hold meetings or demonstrations on public roads, in public parks, in houses of worship, in public buildings, installations and their extensions and in the area with a 1 kilometer radius around the Grand National Assembly.

Meetings and demonstrations will be considered illegal if participants carry firearms, explosive materials, cutting or piercing tools, stones, sticks, metal or rubber rods, bruising or strangling devices such as wires or chains,

incendiary, abrasive or bruising chemicals, any type of poisons, or any gas emission devices as well as posters, placards, signs, pictures, plates or gadgets which are of a nature considered to be illegal; or if slogans of this nature are uttered; or if the activity goes beyond its stated purposes with objectives considered to be criminal by laws; or if the participants do not heed the measures taken.

Voice Amplifier Devices Banned

The ranking property manager of the place where the meeting or demonstration is being held will, under urgent circumstances, be able to ask orally a security official to go to the place of the activity and ask the organizing committee to disperse the activity on grounds that the activity has assumed an illegal nature. Those concerned will be informed that force will be used if the request is not met. If the organizing committee does not meet this request, or if the participants in the activity do not disperse when requested, the security official will warn the participants to disperse and, if this warning is not heeded either, force will be used to disperse the activity. In the event there is deliberate aggression or resistance against the security forces, or if places or persons protected by the security forces come under deliberate attack, no warnings will be issued.

According to the draft bill, all signs and announcements used at meetings or demonstrations will bear the full names of the members of the organizing committee and will not carry writings or pictures which encourage or incite the public to commit crimes. In activities held in closed places voice amplifier devices will not be used to broadcast activity proceedings to the outside.

Penalties

Organizers and participants of illegal meetings or demonstrations will be subject to prison sentences of 1 to 3 years and fines of 10,000 to 25,000 Turkish liras. Members of organizing committees who do not fulfill their responsibilities will be subject to prison sentences of 9 months to 1 year and fines of 10,000 to 30,000 Turkish liras. In meetings or demonstrations where incidents occur, persons who obstruct officials will be subject to prison sentences of 1 1/2 to 5 years and fines of 10,000 to 30,000 Turkish liras.

Persons who obstruct approved meetings or demonstrations will be subject to prison sentences of 9 months to 1 1/2 years and fines of 5,000 to 10,000 Turkish liras. Persons who upset peace and order during a meeting or demonstration will be subject to prison sentences of 1 1/2 to 3 years and fines of 5,000 to 20,000 Turkish liras. Persons who carry illegal placards or photographs will be subject to prison sentences of 1 1/2 to 3 years and fines of 10,000 to 15,000 Turkish liras. In the event crimes are committed as a result of incitations and provocations, both the provokers and those who commit the crime will be subject to prison sentences of 3 to 5 years and fines of 10,000 to 40,000 Turkish liras.

Persons who commot crimes mentioned in the draft bill will be tried in accordance with procedures applied to witnessed crimes irrespective of time and place records of the crime.

After being discussed and, if necessary, amended by the Justice Commission, the draft bill will be taken up by the General Assembly of the Consultative Assembly.

9588

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ACADEMICS EXPRESS VIEWS ON NEW CONSTITUTION

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 12 Feb 82 pp 1,7

[Text of Ankara University Political Science Faculty opinion submitted to the Advisory Assembly Constitutional Commission]

[Text] Ankara--The Ankara University SBF [Political Science Faculty] yesterday sent to Advisory Assembly Constitutional Commission Chairman Prof Orhan Aldikacti its opinions on the new constitution. In the text submitted to Aldikacti, the view that it is necessary that "a turning away from basic rights and freedoms ensured by the 1961 Constitution not become a possibility in the new constitutional system" is defended.

The SBF also asserted that changes in the new constitution, in particular, that will transform the parliamentary system into a semipresidential system or that will destroy the balance between the legislative and executive branches must be avoided. It was stated in the text, "In order to preserve the superiority of the legislative body, the president must be given the power to return once only and together with an explanation a law passed by the TBMM [Turkish Grand National Assembly] for discussion." Furthermore, the formation of a single assembly for the TBMM was adopted as a principle.

Yesterday afternoon, SBF Dean Prof Cevat Geray and his assistants, Prof Kurthan Fisek and Prof Rona Aybay, visited Constitutional Commission Chairman Prof Aldikacti in the conference room of the Advisory Assembly. During the discussion, views regarding the new constitution were submitted to Professor Aldikacti in the form of a written text prepared by Professor Geray and assistant SBF faculty members. The text under the heading, "Thoughts and proposals related to the special interests and activities of our institution," spoke of legal modifications other than those in the new constitution that deal with universities. It read,

"Universities must be administered and supervised by their own organs made up of qualified faculty members selected from among themselves."

The introduction of the text approved by the faculty council was entitled, "General Thoughts and Proposals for the Constitution." The text stated, "Our faculty, accepting as basic the parliamentary system within a pluralistic, free democratic system, has given its views and thoughts on the new constitution being prepared."

It also asserted that an explicit statute must be placed in the constitution that states that "respect and protection for human life and human dignity" is the most fundamental principle for the existence of the state and the community and is the essence of and basic philosophy behind fundamental rights and freedoms.

The SBF's thoughts of and proposals for the constitution, which were submitted to the Constitutional Commission chairman by Professor Geray, read as follows:

A. Modification of Basic Rights and Freedoms

The principles that must be included in the new constitution from the standpoint of basic rights and freedoms are:

1. A turning away from basic rights and freedoms ensured by the 1961 Constitution must not become a possibility in the new constitutional system.
2. When the new constitution is drafted, in addition to personal freedoms, new social and economic rights in decisions and agreements accepted in the last 20 years within the United Nations, UNESCO, the International Labor Organization, and the Council of Europe must be examined as a requirement of the principle of a social state. We list, as examples, the most important of these:

[a.] The right of persons to live in a healthy environment must be protected as a balance against industrial developments.

[b.] Union rights befitting the characteristics of civil servants and public employees must be recognized, and these workers must be prevented from being victimized any longer. Measures to ensure that these unions engage in activities within the framework of their professional purpose must be taken through the enactment of laws.

3. An explicit statute must be placed in the constitution that states that respect and protection for human life and human dignity is the most fundamental principle for the existence of the state and the community and is the essence of and basic philosophy behind fundamental rights and freedoms.

4. When limiting basic rights and freedoms, the essence of each right must be categorically protected in the manner of the 1961 Constitution. The authority of legislators to set limitations that remain outside the essence of the freedoms must be bound to sound standards and principles that prevent the setting of arbitrary limits. Restrictions must only be able to be made by keeping in mind the unique characteristic of each freedom and right and only by law when there is justification in concrete situations related to the goals of national security, public order, public good, and social justice.

5. For this purpose, independent judicial supervision that will oversee limitations from the standpoint of objective standards and principles included in the constitution and that will cause these standards and principles to become effective and viable is an inescapable condition from the standpoint of protecting basic rights. Both the Constitutional Court and the Council of State head the institutions that can ensure this.

B. Legislative Powers

1. The legislative function must be carried out by the TBMM, which is selected by general vote and whose number of members is set down in the constitution.

2. The legislative body must only be formed by a general election which makes it possible for political parties, which are an inescapable element of a democracy, to compete. A corporative system must not be considered.

3. The TBMM, which will perform the legislative function, must consist of a single assembly. The bicameral legislature is, today, superfluous in the unique federal state system. It must not be forgotten that, in nations in which the constitutionality of laws is checked judicially, a pair of assemblies causes legislative activities to slow down.

4. The legislative authority (to enact, amend, and lift laws) must be used only by the TBMM, which has the qualities of a legislative body.

5. Regular general elections for the legislative branch must be held every 4 years.

6. By-elections are an element of the democratic system. By-elections must be included in the constitution, but details must be defined by law in a manner such that political stability is not harmed.

7. In order to ensure the viability of parliament and to prevent obstacles from standing in its way, a quorum for the TBMM must be reduced to less than a simple majority.

8. Methods to be applied in the work of the legislative body must be regulated by bylaws and in respect to principles.

The basic principles of bylaws must include the following:

[a.] A nonpartisan administration must be ensured.

[b.] The basis for assembly work must be the implementation of the government program.

[c.] The opposition's right to supervise and criticize must be protected adequately.

9. The power to supervise the government and to depose it must belong exclusively to the legislative body. However, measures to prevent government crises and to ensure stable governments must be included in the constitution.

10. Changes must be avoided that, in particular, will transform the parliamentary system into a semipresidential system and that will destroy the balance between the legislative and executive branches.

11. The mechanism for holding new elections must be designed in a manner to serve the purpose of preventing government crises and of creating a sound majority government.

C. Executive Powers

1. The executive branch consists of the president and the government.

2. The president must be elected by the TBMM from among its own members, and means to simplify this selection must be found.

3. So that traditional democratic balance can be maintained, the office of the presidency must not be held for an excessive length of time, nor must the same person be allowed to be reelected.

4. The functions of the president and the situations in which he is to be nonpartisan, accountable, and not held accountable must be set down in a manner appropriate to the principles of a democratic legal state.

5. In order to preserve the superiority of the legislative body, the president must be given the power to return once only and together with an explanation a law passed by the TBMM for discussion.

6. The formation of a government, its continuation, and its stepping down must be dependent upon a vote of confidence.

7. The political responsibilities of the prime minister and his ministers must be defined in accordance with the requirements of the parliamentary system. Supervision, questioning, and general discussion related with these responsibilities must be ensured through assembly studies, questioning of

ministers, and assembly investigations. The need for the TBMM to be effective in its supervision and the government to be effective in its carrying out of its executive duties must be perceived as balanced.

8. The prime minister must be appointed by the president. The members of the Council of Ministers must be selected by the prime minister and appointed by the president.

D. Judicial Powers

1. The independence and nonpartisanship of the courts at every level must be protected categorically.

2. The functions of appointing, promoting, extending terms, and dismissing judges and other procedures unique to the courts must be carried out by their own autonomous organizations.

3. In order to be able to ensure the workability of the courts and to ensure speedy trials, the establishment of both judicial and administrative regional courts must be considered.

4. Judicial duties must be designed as a function of solving, within the principles of human rights and a social, legal state, disagreements between individuals and between an individual and the state.

5. Judicial control over the constitutionality of laws must definitely be ensured. However, this supervision must not be of the quality that would impede the functioning of the legal mechanism.

6. Every form of activity and operation of the administration must be subject to judicial control.

E. Organizations Asked To Be Included in Constitution

The following must be designed as constitutional organizations:

1. National Security Council, an advisory body in the solving of national defense and general security problems.

2. State Planning Organization, an advisory body in the drafting of economic and social development plans.

3. TRT [Turkish Radio and Television Administration], an autonomous and nonpartisan broadcasting body in the formulating of unconstrained public opinion and the transmitting of knowledge, culture, and art.

4. The autonomous university, a contemporary scientific, cultural, and teaching institution.

5. Autonomous local administrative units and unions of these, an imperative result of democracy's reliance on the people at every level from the grass roots to the top.

Universities

Thoughts and proposals related to the special interests and activities of our institution:

[1.] The university must be included in the constitution as an autonomous institution.

[2.] Universities must be public corporate bodies possessing academic, administrative, and monetary autonomy, but which are established by the state and through law.

[3.] Universities must be administered and supervised by their own organs composed of qualified faculty members selected from among themselves.

[4.] University bodies, teaching members, and assistants must not be released from their duties in any manner whatsoever by officials outside the university.

[5.] University teaching members and assistants must be ensured independent research and publication.

[6.] The universities law must be a "framework law" whose general guidelines are defined and which ensures the possibility that there will be a law befitting the special characteristics of the universities and faculties.

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